No. 75-1102

DAYTON BOARD OF EDUCATION,
WILLIAM E. DOOLEY,
JOSEPH H. CROSBY and
JAMES D. HART

Petitioners,

v.

MARK BRINKMAN,
PATTY BRINKMAN and
PHILLIP BRINKMAN,
By Their Mother and Next Friend, Deana
Brinkman, *et al.*
(Additional Respondents Inside Cover)

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1975

No. ----------

DAYTON BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Petitioners,

v.

MARK BRINKMAN, et al.,
Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

The petitioners, Dayton Board of Education, two individual Board members, William E. Goodwin and Josephine Groff, and a former Board member, James D. Hart, pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit entered in this proceeding on June 24, 1975.

I. OPINIONS BELOW

The June 24, 1975 opinion of the Court of Appeals, not yet reported, appears in the Appendix to this petition for writ of certiorari. The opinion of the Court of Appeals issued on August 20, 1974 is reported at 503 F.2d 684 and is reprinted in the Appendix. The unreported opinions of the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio were rendered on February 7, 1973; July 13, 1973; January 7, 1975; and March 10, 1975. All of these opinions appear in the Appendix hereto.

II. JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was made and entered on June 24, 1975. A copy of this judgment is appended to this petition at page 89a of the Appendix.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

III. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

A. Does The Imposition Of A System-Wide School Remedy Violate 28 U.S.C. § 1712 And Does Such Imposition Exceed The Remedial And Equitable Powers Of The Federal Court, Where, Although Segregative Practices Affecting Certain Schools Have Been Found To Exist, It Has Been Affirmatively Determined That The School Board Has At No Time Maintained A Dual System?

B. Is A Desegregation Remedy That Will Result In Resegregation Constitutionally Mandated?

C. Does The Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Particularly 20 U.S.C. § 1755, Limit The Use Of Transportation As A Desegregative Device In The Absence Of A Finding That All Alternative Remedies Are Inadequate?

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED.

A. Fourteenth Amendment To the United States Constitution, Section 1:

> ". . . nor shall any such State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."

B. United States Code, Title 20:

§ 1702. Congressional findings: necessity for Congress to specify appropriate remedies for elimination of dual school systems without affecting judicial enforcement of fifth and fourteenth amendments

(a) The Congress finds that–

(1) the maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned to schools solely on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin denies to those students the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment;

(2) for the purpose of abolishing dual school systems and eliminating the vestiges thereof, many local educational agencies have been required to reorganize their school systems, to reassign students, and to engage in the extensive transportation of students;

(3) the implementation of desegregation plans that require extensive student transportation has, in many cases, required local educational agencies to expend large amount of funds, thereby depleting their financial resources available for the maintenance or improvement of the quality of educational facilities and instruction provided:

(4) transportation of students which creates serious risks to their health and safety, disrupts the educational process carried out with respect to such students, and impinges significantly on their educational opportunity, is excessive;

(5) the risks and harms created by excessive transportation are particularly great for children enrolled in the first six grades; and

(6) the guidelines provided by the courts for fashioning remedies to dismantle dual school systems have been, as the Supreme Court of the United States has said, "incomplete and imperfect," and

have not established, a clear, rational, and uniform standard for determining the extent to which a local educational agency is required to reassign and transport its students in order to eliminate the vestiges of a dual school system.

(b) For the foregoing reasons, it is necessary and proper that the Congress, pursuant to the powers granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, specify appropriate remedies for the elimination of the vestiges of dual school systems, except that the provisions of this chapter are not intended to modify or diminish the authority of the courts of the United States to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

§ 1712. Formulating remedies; applicability

In formulating a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity or a denial of the equal protection of the laws, a court, department, or agency of the United States shall seek to impose only such remedies as are essential to correct particular denials of equal educational opportunity or equal protection of the laws.

§ 1713. Priority of remedies

In formulating a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity or a denial of the equal protection of the laws, which may involve directly or indirectly the transportation of students, a court, department, or agency of the United States shall consider and make specific findings on the efficacy in correcting such denial of the following remedies and shall require implementation of the first of the remedies set out below, or of the first combination thereof which would remedy such denial:

(a) assigning students to the schools closest to their places of residence which provide the appropriate grade level and type of education for such students, taking into account school capacities and natural physicial barriers;

(b) assigning students to the schools closest to their places of residence which provide the appropriate grade level and type of education for such students, taking into account only school capacities;

(c) permitting students to transfer from a school in which a majority of the students are of their race, color, or national origin to a school in which a minority of the students are of their race, color, or national origin;

(d) the creation or revision of attendance zones or grade structures without requiring transportation beyond that described in section 1714 of this title;

(e) the construction of new schools or the closing of inferior schools;

(f) the construction or establishment of magnet schools; or

(g) the development and implementation of any other plan which is educationally sound and administratively feasible, subject to the provisions of sections 1714 and 1715 of this title.

§ 1755. Additional priority of remedies after finding of de jure segregation

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, after June 30, 1974 no court of the United States shall order the implementation of any plan to remedy a finding of de jure segregation which involves the transportation of students, unless the court first finds that all alternative remedies are inadequate.

C. Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 33,

"§ 3313.48. Free Education To Be Provided; Minimum School Year.

The Board of Education of each city, exempted village, local and joint vocational school district shall provide for the free education of the youth of school age within the district under its jurisdiction at such places as will

be most convenient for the attendance of the largest number thereof."

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The complaint commencing this school desegregation action was filed in the United States Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, on April 17, 1972 by parents acting on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor children who attended schools in the Dayton Public School District and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (all of whom are hereinafter referred to as adverse respondents). Named as defendants to the complaint were the Governor of Ohio, the Attorney General of Ohio, the State Board of Education, the Superintendent of Ohio Department of Education, six individual members of the Dayton Board of Education and the Superintendent of the Dayton School District.

A trial on the single issue of whether the school system of Dayton was a segregated one by reason of acts of the Dayton Board of Education commenced on November 13, 1972. Equity jurisdiction of the District Court was predicated upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1343.

On February 7, 1973 the Trial Court rendered an opinion in which it found that racially imbalanced schools, optional attendance zones and recent Board action in rescinding three resolutions calling for racial and economic balance in each school in the Dayton system constituted a cumulative violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and that the rescission action constituted an independent constitutional violation (Appendix at 11a, 12a). While school practices in the area of staff assignment,[1] establishment of attendance zones, school construction

[1] By 1969 the Dayton School proportionately employed more black teachers and administrators than any of the twenty largest school

and site selection, grade structure and reorganization, student transfers and transportation were alleged to have constituted the establishment of a dual system, these practices were passed upon by the District Judge and were found free from any segregative intent or effect (Appendix at 5a-10a).

In order to correct the constitutional violations, the District Court ordered the Dayton Board to submit a plan which would (1) abolish all optional zones (2) restate the priorities of the freedom of enrollment program so that racial transfers would take precedence over curriculum transfers (3) maintain the faculty assignment practices so that the faculty in each school would continue to reflect the approximate racial balance of the total black-to-white faculty in the Dayton system (4) establish hiring practices which would enable the clerical and maintenance personnel hired by the Dayton system to approximate the proportion of the black-to-white population within the Dayton system.

In compliance with the February 7, 1973 order of the District Court, the Dayton Board submitted its plan to the Trial Court. This plan contained eleven points:

(1) Elimination of all elementary and high school optional areas;

(2) Revision of the Freedom of Enrollment Program whereby racial balance took priority over other permissible transfers;

(3) Declaration that faculty assignment to each school would continue to reflect a racial composition that would approximate a ratio of black-to-white faculty in the entire district;

(4) Modification of hiring policies for classified personnel;

(5) Establishment of four city-wide elementary science

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districts in Ohio (Defendant Board of Education Ex. AQ) and since the fall of 1971 faculty in the Dayton system have been assigned in such a manner that the ratio between the black and white teachers in each school substantially reflects the ratio between the black and white teachers in the system as a whole (Defendant Board of Education, Ex. AN).

centers, the enrollment of which would approximate the existing black-white ratio of students in the system;

(6) Combination of two high schools into a unified cooperative school with district-wide attendance areas;

(7) Formation of elementary and high school all-city bands, orchestras and choruses;

(8) Provisions for scheduling of integrated athletics;

(9) Establishment of a minority language program for education of staff;

(10) Utilization of the Living Arts Center for inter-racial experiences in art, creative writing, dance and drama;

(11) Creation of centers for rumor control, school guidance and area learning.

After submission of the Board plan and after publication of *Keyes* v. *School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,* 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the District Judge entered a supplemental order on remedy (Appendix at 26a-31a). In this July 13, 1973 opinion the Trial Court stated that there was no "evidence of a failure of the equality of facilities, instructors and curricula opportunities . . ." (*Id.* at 30a). The Trial Court adopted the Board plan with the modification that any student could attend any high school of his or her choice within the Dayton system.

An appeal from the constitutional violations and remedy judgment of the District Court was filed by the adverse respondents, and the Dayton Board cross-appealed. On August 20, 1974 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the finding of three cumulative constitutional violations. *Brinkman* v. *Gilligan,* 503 F.2d 684, 693 (6th Cir. 1974); Appendix at 32a-69a.

The Court of Appeals did not, however, pass upon the question of whether the rescission action constituted an independent constitutional violation. Rather, the appellate court stated that "[t]he question of whether a rescission of previous Board action is in and of itself a violation of the appellants' constitutional rights is inextricably bound up with the ques-

tion of whether the Board is under a constitutional duty to take the action which it initially took". Continuing, the Court of Appeals held that "[i]f the Board was not under such a duty, then the rescission of the initial action in and of itself cannot be a constitutional violation. If the Board is under such a duty, then the rescission becomes part of the cumulative violation, and it is not necessary to ascertain whether the rescission *ipso facto* is an independent violation of the Constitution" (*Id.* at 696; Appendix at 55a).

On the remedy issue raised in the appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the remedy prescribed by the District Court was inadequate in light of the Court of Appeals' view of the nature of the violations. Accordingly, the action was remanded to the Trial Court for formulation of another desegregation plan consistent with the remedial guidelines of *Keyes* and *Swann* (*Id.* at 704; Appendix at 69a).

After the appellate remand the District Court ordered the Board and any other interested parties to submit desegregation plans. Under the plan submitted by the adverse respondents each and every school in the Dayton system would have become racially balanced; that is, the black-white student ratio in each school would approximate within a plus or minus fifteen percent the black-white ratio of the entire district (Appendix at 77a-78a). The plan submitted by the Dayton Board contained the following key elements:

(1) The closing of the all black Roosevelt High School with the students who would have attended this school being given priority under open enrollment to attend any high school;

(2) Creation of a downtown magnet high school and satellite magnets at the predominantly black schools of Dunbar and Roth with enrollments in the specialized courses offered at these magnets open to students throughout the district;

(3) Creation of magnet learning centers for foreign languages, business education and career motivation for sixth through eighth grade students;

(4) Establishment of a new vocational high school where student enrollment would be racially balanced;

(5) Expansion of the science learning centers to accommodate additional middle school students (participants in this successful, mandatory program would attend racially balanced classes for approximately ten percent of their time);

(6) Establishment of a structured, alternative elementary school at the predominantly black Miami Chapel School where enrollment would reflect the approximate racial balance of the system for those students who attended this elective full time school.

After a hearing on the plans, the District Court rejected the plan of the adverse respondents; found that racial balance in each and every school in the school district was not required under *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); and concluded that the racial balance plan of the adverse respondents was violative of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (Appendix at 79a). In provisionally accepting the plan of the Dayton Board for the 1975-76 school year, the Trial Court held that the plan of the Board was desegregative in intent and integrative in effect (*Id.* at 80a, 83a).

In this order of March 10, 1975 the District Judge additionally held that (1) the State of Ohio has not since 1887 mandated a dual system (*Id.* at 75a); (2) although the Dayton Board has engaged in activities that were segregative in effect and which impinged upon the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, the Board did not at any time maintain a dual system of education (*Id.* at 75a, 77a); and (3) there were no district-wide segregative acts (*Cf.* Appendix at 77a and n. 7 thereon).

The March 10, 1975 order accepting the Board plan was again appealed by the adverse respondents to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. A motion of the adverse respondents for summary reversal was deferred pending a stepped-up time for submission of briefs and argument. While declining to grant

summary reversal because of the time factor between the rendition of the opinion and the opening of school in the fall of 1975, the Court of Appeals remanded the action to the District Court with the direction that "the Court adopt a system-wide plan for the 1976-77 school year that will conform to the previous mandate of this Court and with the decisions of the Supreme Court in *Keyes* and *Swann*" (Appendix at 96a).

In this most recent opinion, rendered on June 24, 1975 the Court of Appeals held that the Board plan was inadequate since "the basic pattern of one-race schools would continue largely unabated" and "the vast majority of one-race schools will remain identifiably as such" (*Id.* at 93a). Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 did not limit the scope of the remedy for the constitutional violations found to exist (*Id.* at 95a).

Although racial imbalance exists in the schools comprising the Dayton district, the student population of each school is consistent with the black-white geographical distribution of the Dayton area (Appendix at 5a). All sixty-eight schools of the Dayton system – fifty-two elementary, five middle and eleven high schools – with the exception of the city-wide co-operative high school were uniformly and impartially located in areas where students or potential students were concentrated (R. 1783).

In compliance with section 3313.48 of the Ohio Revised Code, attendance zones for each school, excepting the co-operative high school, were drawn so as to make access from home to school as convenient as possible for the greatest number of students (R. 1560). These zones were not irregular in shape, were not gerrymandered and have remained essentially stable over the past twenty years notwithstanding changes in the student composition whereby many of the schools changed from predominantly white to predominantly black (R. 1590, Appendix at 52a-56a). In 1969 the assignment patterns were modified by enactment of a Freedom of Enrollment policy which permitted student transfers for the purpose of racial balance (R. 1334-35). The effect of this program was reflected in

the fact that as of the beginning of the 1972-73 school year, no all-white schools existed within the Dayton system (Board of Education Ex. AS).

Numerous optional areas were created in the Dayton system in the 1950's and the early 1960's. These optional areas, which permitted a student residing in a designated zone to attend one of two schools, were scattered throughout the system (R. 1629) and were located so as to be equidistant from the two schools that they served (R. 1606). Standards of access, safety, school capacity, convenience and prior patterns of attendance were the criteria governing the establishment of optional zones.

While the District Court found that the convenience concept may have embraced desires motivated by racial consideration in possibly three optional areas, it specifically held that the "majority of the optional zones had no racial significance at the time of their creation" and that "none of the elementary school optional zones today have had significant potential effects in terms of increased racial separation" (Appendix at 8a). Moreover, those optional zones which were found to be in violation of constitutional rights did not involve a substantial or significant segment of the school system.[2]

On December 8, 1971 a lame duck Board of Education, whose majority had lost the November, 1971 election, passed three resolutions. One of these resolutions required the elimination of all attendance zones with concomitant transportation of students for purposes of achieving a racial and economic balance of students within each school in the Dayton system. After several parliamentary maneuvers, the new Board majority on January 3, 1972 took action which in the opinion of the District Court constituted a rescission of the three resolutions (Appendix at 11a).

While the rescission action was held by the District Court to have constituted an independent constitutional violation, the

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[2] See Appendix at 75a and 77a wherein the District Court, after the initial remand, found that the Dayton Board had at no time maintained a dual system.

Sixth Circuit held simply that the rescission was part of the cumulative violation since rescission alone could not constitute a violation of the Constitution unless there was a constitutional duty to take the action that was rescinded. *Brinkman* v. *Gilligan*, 503 F.2d 684, 704 (6th Cir. 1974).

It is apparent that the finding with respect to optional zones is the keystone of the cumulative violation which the Court found to exist. Without this finding, neither of the other two findings comprising the cumulative violation would have constitutional significance. In the absence of a constitutional duty, the school board was as free to rescind the December resolutions as it was to adopt them. The third finding – a condition of racial imbalance in schools as a result of the geographic distribution of races in the school system – would be constitutionally innocuous in and of itself. *Lawlor* v. *Board of Education of City of Chicago*, 458 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1972); *Bradley* v. *School Board of City of Richmond*, 462 F.2d 1058, 1069 (4th Cir. 1972), *aff'd*, equally divided court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973); *Spencer* v. *Kugler*, 326 F.Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1971), *aff'd*, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972); *Deal* v. *Cincinnati Board of Education*, 419 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1969), *cert. denied*, 402 U.S. 962 (1971).

VI. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed because (1) it erroneously requires a remedy which is in conflict with the prohibitions and considerations contained in *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) and *Milliken* v. *Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717, 41 L.Ed 2d 1069 (1974) and (2) the lower court has decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be settled by the Supreme Court.

Should this Court fail to grant certiorari in this case and resolve the issues presented, the Sixth Circuit will have established three precedents that could have a devastating effect on future cases in the school desegregation area. First, the Sixth

Circuit has espoused a "land mine" theory of desegregation by mandating a district-wide remedy while affirming the District Court's finding of fact in favor of the school board in all but the limited area of optional zones. It has in effect abandoned any relationship between nature of violation and scope of remedy. Whenever a school board permits an isolated segregative act or series of acts, it triggers off a system-wide remedy of eliminating racially identifiability by balancing the races in each school in the system.[3] Such a holding abandons prior decisions of this Court and creates a confusion in the law that cannot be permitted to exist.

Second, by erroneously equating desegregation with elimination of any predominantly white or predominantly black schools throughout the system, the Sixth Circuit has closed its eyes to desegregative devices that may carry some positive integrative force. As the evidence demonstrates, the available choice of remedy under the Sixth Circuit's mandate is limited to a system-wide approach of moving students to achieve a racial balance that will lead inexorably to a resegregation of the school system. As the testimony presented to the District Court indicated and as experience throughout the country has confirmed, forced transportation to achieve racial balance will serve only to drive whites and middle class blacks out of the school system. The result of such action would transmute a constitutional promise of equal educational opportunity into the ashes of an impoverished school system serving a low economic, predominantly black student population. Can this Court sit idly by and permit the achievement of such a result in the name of the Constitution?

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[3] The Sixth Circuit continues to follow the assumption that schools cannot be truly desegregated unless the racial composition of the student body in each school substantially reflects the racial composition of students in the system as a whole, despite the Supreme Court's determination that the Sixth Circuit was in error in making that assumption in *Milliken* v. *Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069, 1088-89 (1974).

As this case demonstrates, the district and circuit courts of this country need guidance on these critical problems. This case presents an opportunity for this Court to resume and assert its leadership in an area of constitutional law that has an immediate effect on every school child and parent in the country. It also provides the Court with its first opportunity to construe the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974. According to the Sixth Circuit, this Act is waste paper. This Court should announce whether such is indeed the case or whether the Act constitutes a valid and meaningful establishment by Congress of priorities in the application of desegregation remedies.

A. The Appellate Decision Conflicts With The Decisions Of This Court Rendered In Swann And Milliken.

The first two questions presented by this petition involve departures by the Sixth Circuit from principles that have been established by this Court. Reassertion and clarification of those principles is required in the specific context of this and other so-called "northern cases" that are now in litigation or are reaching that stage.

1. The scope of the remedy in desegregation cases should be dictated by the nature of the constitutional violation. In fashioning desegregation decrees, equitable principles control. *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). The "task is to correct, by balancing of the individual collective interests, the condition that offends the constitution". *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra* at 16. *Milliken* v. *Bradley, supra* at 1087. A remedial desegregation power exercised by a federal court can only be invoked on the basis of a constitutional violation and the scope of the remedy cannot exceed the nature of the violation. *Id* at 16, 41 L.Ed.2d at 1087. Before any affirmative duty arises to dismantle and to eliminate the identifiability of one race schools, there must be a finding of a dual system mandated by state statute or a dual

system predicated upon evidence establishing state imposed segregation in a substantial portion of the school district. *Keyes* v. *School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,* 413 U.S. 189, 200, 203, 208-209 (1973).

In the instant action the unreversed findings of the District Court are that the Dayton system did not at any time "maintain a dual system of education" (Appendix at 75a, 77a). This holding of a non-dual system not only includes the finding that the Dayton district was not operating a mandated dual system as proscribed in *Brown* v. *Board of Education,* 347 U.S. 483 (1954), but also that the cumulative constitutional violations did not constitute state imposed segregation in a substantial or significant portion of the district as proscribed in *Keyes.* Thus, in rejecting plans which remedied isolated and individual *de jure* segregation practices (See Appendix at 75a, 77a) and in remanding this action for implementation of a system-wide remedy, the Sixth Circuit has decided the remedy issue in a manner which conflicts with the holdings of this Court in *Swann* and *Milliken.*

Since the cumulative violations did not involve district-wide action so as to constitute a dual system, the remedy must be limited to a correction of the isolated and individual unconstitutional practices. It cannot constitutionally or equitably be extended to the elimination of racially imbalanced schools which came into existence as a result simply of the geographic distribution of races in the school system. The remedies adopted by the District Court completely eliminated the optional zones and any vestige of segregation that could conceivably have been related to those zones. By adopting the school board's innovative proposals of magnet schools and learning centers, the District Court legitimately exceeded the constitutional remedy dictated by its finding of violations to provide a mechanism for achieving meaningful integration of the student population of the entire system while enhancing the opportunities of that student population for quality education.

2. In a desegregation case the Constitution cannot be deemed to mandate a remedy that will result in resegregation of the school system. In addition to ordering a remedy which exceeds the nature of the violation, the Court of Appeals has contravened the equitable holdings in *Swann* which require a "balancing of the individual and collective interests" and the taking of necessary steps to convert the school system to a "unitary system". *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra* at 15-16.

The evidence presented at the hearing which was held after the first remand establishes that as a result of the demographic situation existing in the Dayton district, any effort to achieve racial balance in each school in the system requires pairing and clustering of schools with concomitant busing of children past the closest and the second closest school of their residence (R. 232, 300 hearing on remand). The testimony of the adverse respondents' own witness was that these desegregation devices have not worked in the past and eventually result in a poor city with a poor school system (*Id.* at 157, 185). Injunctive relief in such cases cannot extend to parents of school children, and for a variety of reasons a forced busing plan can be expected to drive white and upper middle class blacks out of the system, leaving behind a low economic, predominantly black student population.

Certainly a remedy which defeats the goal of providing an equal educational opportunity for minority students and which will lead to resegregation of the city's schools is not constitutionally mandated. Indeed, an ironic and sad situation is presented when in the name of the Constitution, the rights and the opportunities which the Constitution was designed to protect are destroyed. Further, the action of a federal court in imposing a plan that would inevitably lead to resegregation of the school system is no less a segregative practice than those unconstitutional practices which initially required federal intervention. The Constitution requires and equitable principles dictate the acceptance of a plan that contains curriculum inno-

vations, offers quality education, is desegregative in intent, is integrative in effect and follows the congressionally approved remedies contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1713. Any system-wide plan that will result in resegregation and a non-unitary system should be rejected.

B. The Court Of Appeals Has Decided An Important Question Of Federal Law Which Has Not Been, But Should Be, Settled By This Supreme Court.

The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals raised a question of first impression for this Court. The construction and validity of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

Unlike Title IV of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6) (See *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra* at 17-18), the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (20 U.S.C. § 1701, *et seq.*) provides the judiciary with material assistance in answering remedial questions in state imposed segregation cases. Under the 1974 Act, the Courts are directed to impose "only such remedies as are essential to correct particular denials of . . . equal protection of the law" (20 U.S.C. § 1712). The Courts are required to implement specific remedies or combinations thereof in a progressive order depending upon their effectiveness in correcting constitutional violations (20 U.S.C. § 1713). While transportation is recognized as a last remedial resort, it may be utilized only upon a finding that all alternative remedies are inadequate (20 U.S.C. § 1755).

In construing the 1974 Act the Sixth Circuit simply held that the act did not limit the scope of the remedy for the constitutional violations found (Appendix at 95a). This begs the question presented since the constitutional violations in this case were not held to constitute the establishment of a dual system. The Court of Appeals in remanding this action for implementation of a system-wide remedy that would eliminate and dismantle the existing patterns of one-race schools has

therefore emasculated the congressional directives contained in 20 U.S.C. § 1712. Moreover, since the schools comprising the Dayton system cannot be racially balanced without transportation (R. 232, hearing on remand), and since there has been no finding that "all alternative remedies are inadequate", the order of the Sixth Circuit violates the directives contained in 20 U.S.C. § 1755.

The holding that the exception provision contained in paragraph (b) of 20 U.S.C. § 1702 does not limit the scope of the remedy is contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1702(a), 1712, 1713 and 1755. Congress certainly did not intend to enact meaningless legislation. The congressional intent as evidenced by the explicit language contained in these sections was (1) to establish an obligatory order of remedies or combinations thereof that a court must follow and (2) to prohibit transportation as a desegregative remedy in the absence of a finding that all other alternative remedies are inadequate. In the absence of such a finding – and here there was no such finding – subsection (b) of 20 U.S.C. § 1702 does not become operative. This construction of the 1974 Act is not only logically sound; it is also constitutionally sound – logical in the sense that a legislative provision is given an interpretation that does not render the remaining provisions of the enactment meaningless and constitutional in the sense that no constitutional issue is needlessly raised.

VII. CONCLUSION

The plans of the Dayton Board which was accepted by the Trial Court but rejected by the Court of Appeals remedy the constitutional violations which were found. The remedial order of the Sixth Circuit which required a district-wide remedy with elimination of one-race schools is not only contrary to Section 20 U.S.C. § 1712 and in conflict with the equitable principles enunciated by this Court in *Swann* and *Keyes*, it also requires the utilization of a remedy that will result in resegregation. The Sixth Circuit's construction of

the 1974 Equal Educational Opportunities Act, moreover, involves issues not previously determined, but which should be settled by this Supreme Court.

The issues presented by this petition – appropriate scope of remedy, dangers of resegregation from ill-advised decrees and effect of recent legislation on the fashioning of orders in desegregation cases – are critical issues not only in this case but in similar cases across the country. It is inevitable that this Court will pass on these issues, and we respectfully submit that the constitutional demands for orderly development of the law of desegregation and the social demands for guidance in this troubling area dictate that this Court's task of addressing the issues presented not be deferred. A writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

A. FEBRUARY 7, 1973 FINDINGS OF FACT

(Filed February 7, 1973)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Civil No. 72-137

MARK BRINKMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN J. GILLIGAN, Governor
of the State of Ohio, et al.,

Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND MEMORANDUM OPINION OF LAW

This is a school desegregation suit brought as a class action by the parents of black children attending schools operated by the defendant Dayton (Ohio) Board of Education. This Court has proper equity jurisdiction under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; see *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); 349 U.S. 294, 300-301 (1955), and under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981 and 1983, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1343.

This matter is before the Court upon the briefs, stipulations and exhibits presented by the respective parties; and upon the record adduced during expedited hearing conducted by

Court from November 13 through December 1, 1972. The limited queston before the Court at said hearing was whether acts by the defendant Dayton School Board have created segregated educational facilities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Having carefully examined the evidence presented, the Court, pursuant to Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., enters the following findings of fact and memorandum opinion of law.

I

FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Historical Perspective

(1) The evidence presented has established isolated but repeated instances of failure by the Dayton School Board to meet the standards of the Ohio law mandating an integrated school system.[1] Such instances include a physical segregation into separate buildings of pupils and teachers by race at the Garfield School in the early 1920's, a denial to blacks of access to swimming pools in high schools in the 1930's and 1940's and

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[1] Section 3313.48, Ohio Revised Code, provides in relevant part that:

> "[t]he Board of Education of each city . . . shall provide for the free education of the youth of school age within the district under its jurisdiction at such places as will be most convenient for the attendance of the largest number thereof . . ."

This has been the law of Ohio since February 22, 1887, when it was enacted by 85 Ohio Laws 34. The statute was upheld and enforced in 1888 by the Supreme Court of Ohio in *Board of Educaton* v. *State*, 45 O.St. 555, as follows:

> "Section 4008 having been repealed by the Act of the General Assembly passed February 22, 1887 (84 Ohio Law 34), separate schools for colored children have been abolished and no regulation can be made under Section 4013 that does not apply to all children, irrespective of race or color:"

the exclusion, between 1938 and 1948, of black high school teams from the city athletic conference.[2]

Prior to *Brown*, however, physical isolaton of black students ended, swimming pools were no longer restricted, and black athletic teams competed on an equal basis with all other Dayton High Schools.

While arguably consistent with the social mores of the times, the treatment of black children during this period was at least inhumane and by present standards, reprehensible. The practices of the Dayton School Board were also, during that period, in contravention of Ohio law as cited in n.1, *supra*. Both by reason of the substantial time that has elapsed and because these practices have ceased, however, the foregoing will not necessarily be deemed to be evidence of a continuing segregative policy.

(2) Not to be dismissed on a *deminimus* theory are the practices of the Dayton School Board with regard to the hiring and placement of its teachers. In the past thirty-odd years three separate policies have been followed. Until the decade of the 1930's, there was little, if any, hiring of black teachers. Those who were hired were used in instruction of predominately black classes. During and following World War II the black population of Dayton substantially increased. Black teachers were hired in greater number, although such teachers did not teach in schools which were predominately white. While there is no direct evidence that black teachers were forbidden to teach white children at any school, in practice few actually did. Some evidence consistent with the assumption that black educators and black principals would be more understanding, sympathetic, and inspiring to black students has been suggested to the Court.

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[2] For a period in the 1930's and 1940's, the Shawen Acres Orphan Home sent its black and white wards to different schools. Some white children of medical personnel of the Veterans Hospital in Dayton were bused by the hospital to "white" schools. The Dayton School Board, while not initiating these practices, condoned and assisted them.

In the 1951-52 school year, the policy of assigning black teachers only to black schools ended and black teachers were gradually assigned to white or mixed schools. By 1963, under a policy designated as one of "dynamic gradualism," at least one black teacher had been assigned to all eleven high schools and to 35 of the 66 schools in the entire system.

By 1969 each school in the Dayton system had an integrated teaching staff consisting of at least one black faculty member. In the fall of 1971, pursuant to an agreement with the Department of Health, Educaton & Welfare (H.E.W.), the Dayton Board of Education commenced assigning faculty in such a manner that the ratio between black and white teachers in each school substantially reflected the ratio between black and white teachers in the system as a whole. Pursuant to this agreement the teaching staff of the Dayton Public Schools became and still remains substantially integrated.

By 1969 the Dayton School Board employed more black teachers than any other of the 20 largest school districts in Ohio. At that time 28.6% of all teachers were black while 38.3% of all students were black. For the school years 1971-72 and 1972-73, blacks comprised 38% of the non-teaching, non-administrative personnel employed by the Board of Education. Employment of blacks in other positions such as skilled craftsmen, however, remains substantially below the percentage of black student population or the percentage of black teachers and black administrators.

(3) In 1933, the Paul Lawrence Dunbar High School was established. Dunbar High School was intended to be, and did in fact become, a black high school, with an all black teacher and pupil population. At the time of its creation, there were no school attendance zones in Dayton and students were permitted liberal transfers. Attendance at Dunbar was voluntary.

In the 1940's and early 1950's, after reorganization into a K-8, 9-12 grade structure, high school and elementary school

attendance zones were established and enforced in Dayton. Dunbar continued to exist as a city-wide all-black high school until it closed in 1962.

B. The Dayton Public School System Today

(a) Racial Imbalance

(4) The great majority of all schools in the Dayton system today have student populatons which are racially imbalanced, consistent with the black-white population and geographical distribution thereof as shown by the 1970 census.[3] Except at the Patterson Co-op High School, where in the past few years a concerted effort has been made to enroll more black students, no effort has been made by the school board of Dayton to balance by race the student population at any particular school. See Appendix A, *post* at 15.

(b) Attendance Zones

(5) There has been presented no evidence of boundary changes that would channel blacks or whites into specific schools or would restrict blacks from attending any school. Where construction of new schools has required boundary changes, they have been rational, reasonable and within the sound discretion of the Board of Education. No irregular school zones have been created, white students have not been bused past black schools to white schools, nor have black students been bused past white schools to black schools.

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[3] The 1970 census for the city of Dayton indicates 71 census tracts, 45 with a black population of less than 15%, eight with a black population between 15% and 85%, and six with a black population of 85% to 100%.

While the Dayton School District is not geographically identical to the city limits of the City of Dayton, the variations are non-significant in the context of the areas' black-white population.

(6) The Dayton School District contains 57 elementary school attendance areas. No evidence has been presented of gerrymandered boundary lines and the attendance districts are regular in shape. Boundary line changes have occurred only when new schools were constructed for the purpose of relieving overcrowding in existing ones. See Appendix A, *post*, at p. 15.

(7) The middle school program was established on January 4, 1971. Middle schools consist of grades 6, 7 and 8. The middle school program has to date been only partly effectuated in the Dayton system. Elementary schools (kindergarten through eight) are still in operation as well as primary schools (kindergarten through five), and middle schools (six through eight). At the present time there are five middle schools in Dayton: Cornell Heights, Longfellow, MacFarlane, Whittier, and Orville Wright. For the racial compositions of these schools, see Appendix A, *post*, at p. 15.

Attendance boundaries for the middle schools were established in September, 1971, and have neither segregative nor integrative effect.

(8) There are presently eleven high schools in Dayton, ten of which have specific attendance areas. The eleventh, Patterson Co-op High School, enrolls students from the entire district for its vocational education program. The black percentage of attendance at Patterson High School has increased due to an altering of recruitment techniques, from 2.0% in 1963 to 32.9% in 1972. No evidence has been presented that under the present selection system the admission of blacks is denied or discouraged or that the system is segregative in effect.

Dayton has constructed five high schools since 1954 and has altered attendance zones where necessary to accommodate the overcrowding of existing high schools. Other than such alterations, no attendance zone boundaries have been changed. No evidence of the establishment of high school boundary lines for the purpose of creating white high schools and black high schools has been presented.

(c) Site selection and construction

(9) Since 1954 the school board of Dayton has constructed 14 new elementary schools and 69 elementary school additions. The construction follows the pattern of growth in the Dayton area and follows the specific policy of "building schools where children are, or where they are expected to be." New construction of elementary schools was largely on the periphery of the center city. There are instances of errors in Board planning in that some areas have not developed as expected and other developed areas have not become part of the Dayton School District, as expected. There are examples of schools operating substantially below capacity. While reasonable minds might reasonably differ on selection and construction of some schools, sufficient evidence has not been presented that school construction was segregative in nature other than to provide schools in white neighborhoods which remain predominatly white and schools in black neighborhoods which remain predominately black.

(10) Five new high schools and fourteen high school additions have been constructed in the past eighteen years. Construction of some high schools followed the pattern of construction of elementary schools in that sites selected were away from the center of the city and in neighborhoods which were predominately white. Other sites could have been selected near the center of the city in black neighborhoods. Such schools would arguably, at least, have had a larger proportion of whites attending such schools.

Site selection is a matter of judgment and no evidence has been presented that the Board of Education failed to use neutral criteria in its choices. In the construction of schools, the Board, over the years, has been presented with options. Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of showing that the defendant Board exercised those options presented in an improper fashion.

(d) Optional zones

(11) The Board of Education of the Dayton School District has from time to time created optional zones. Optional zones are dual or overlapping attendance areas which allow children residing within them a choice among two or more schools. Some optional attendance zones were created where the more distant school geographically had better access; some were created where the more distant school did not require the crossing of busy intersections, commercial areas, or railroad tracks. Many were created for the convenience of parents. There has been evidence that at times this last concept embraced desires motivated by racial considerations. Seven optional elementary zones and four optional high school zones exist at the present time. All of the others have been abolished. See Appendix B, *post* at 16.

The majority of optional zones had no racial significance at the time of their creation. The Westwood-Jackson, Roosevelt-Colonel White, and Fairview-Roth zones may have constituted exceptions to this general rule and we cannot conclude that these did not have adverse racial effects. Similarly, although none of the elementary school optional zones today have any significant potential effects in terms of increased racial separation, the same cannot be said of the high school optional zones. Two of these zones, those between Roosevelt and Colonel White and between Kiser and Colonel White, are by far the largest in the system and have had the most demonstrable racial effects in the past.

(e) Freedom of Enrollment

(12) By two separate actions the Board of Educaton has established a "Freedom of Enrollment" policy. On May 29, 1969, action was taken whereby the parents of a pupil in good standing in the Dayton Public School District could request assignment of the pupil to any school building within the

district where space was available to accommodate him. Three priorities were established.

(1) Students residing within the attendance area of a school building shall have first priority to assignment to that building;

(2) Students meeting the requirements for a course available only in the particular building shall have second priority for attendance in that building;

(3) A student desiring enrollment in any building for whatever reason shall have third priority in that building, providing his enrollment will contribute to improved racial balance in that building.

The action of May, 1969, further provided that transportation would be the responsibility of the parents.

On January 3, 1972, the Board of Education resolved to continue the Freedom of Enrollment policy with the exception that the Superintendent and his staff were directed to develop and submit before the start of the second semester of the 1971-72 school year a plan providing for the free transportation of the students participating in such program. Such free transportation was adopted by the Board prior to the filing of the complaint herein.

(13) Applications for transfer and dispositions thereof during the school years 1969-1970, 1970-71, 1971-72, 1972-73, are set forth in Appendix C, *post*, at 17. There is no evidence that the Freedom of Enrollment system has been unfairly operated or that black students have been denied transfers because of their race. There is evidence that the capacity of transferee schools has been underestimated and that projections of future enrollment are substantially overestimated. A neutrally administered freedom of enrollment system might in the future reduce somewhat racial imbalance and remove community perception of "black" and "white" schools. However, as the Freedom of Enrollment system is presently constituted, its input towards that goal has been slight. Requests for

transfer have at no time exceeded 1.5% of the total student enrollment.

C. School Board Action – December, 1971 January, 1972

(14) At the general election in November, 1971, the electors of the school district of Dayton elected three members for a four year term commencing January 1, 1972. Issues at such election involved the matter of school attendance zones and transportation of pupils. Two incumbent members of the Board ran for reelection, one did not. One incumbent was reelected and two new members of the Board were added. On December 8, 1971, the 1971 Board met to consider resolutions dea'ing with transportation of students and zone attendance lines. All members present were duly elected, qualified and acting members of the Board, although two of them were so-called "lame ducks," who would not be members of the Board after December 31, 1971.

The Board adopted several resolutions. These resolutions recognized the existence of racial segregation in the Dayton schools, the role played by the Board in the creation of the racial patterns and the concommitant responsibility of the Board to eradicate these patterns through affirmative action. The types of affirmative action recognized included the elimination of the old attendance zones and the transportation of students for the purpose of achieving the city-wide racial balance of students. These resolutions, which are set forth in part in Appendix D, *post*, at 18-22, were adopted by the Dayton School Board by a vote of 5-2.

Immediately thereafter, one member of the Board who had voted with the majority, requested reconsideration and was improperly ruled out of order. The Board met subsequently on December 6, 1971 [sic], and January 3, 1972. At the end of the latter meeting, the Board ended its term of office and the 1972 Board took its place. On January 3, at its first meeting, the 1972 Board rescinded the resolutions passed on December

8. Since the 1971 Board had passed out of existence, the action of the 1972 Board on January 3, 1972, was not in the nature of a reconsideration but instead was a recission of the previous action.

The right of the majority to override protected minority rights has clear limitatons in our constitutional democracy. See *Reitman* v. *Mulkey*, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); *Hunter* v. *Erickson*, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); also see *Alkire* v. *Cashman*, — F.Supp. — (S.D. Ohio E.D. 1972). The recission in early 1972 of the resolutions adopted by the 1971 School Board constituted an independent violation of the Equal Protection Clause rights enjoyed by the black minority of Dayton. See *Bradley* v. *Milliken*, 433 F.2d 897 (C.A.6 1970); *Oliver* v. *Ka'amazoo Board of Education*, 346 F.Supp. 766 (W.D. Mich. S.D. 1971), *aff'd.* 448 F.2d 635 (C.A.6 1971).

OPINION

An examination of the decisional law of this circuit does not provide an identifiable category for the Dayton Public School System. Ohio law, unlike the law of many Southern states, has never mandated the separation of the races in public schools; to the contrary, since 1887 it has specifically prohibited this practice. See n.1, supra. The Dayton system is a square peg for the round holes of Memphis, Knoxville, and other southern cities.[4] It is, however, also a round peg for

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[4] Compare, for example, the intransigence of the Nashville School Board in *Kelley* v. *Metropolitan County Bd.*, —— F.2d —— Nos. 71-1778 & 79 (C.A. 6 May 30, 1972). See also *Northcross* v. *Board of Education of Memphis*, 420 F.2d 546 (C.A.6 1970), *aff'd.* 397 U.S. 232 (1970); 444 F.2d 1179, 1184 (C.A.6 1971); *Goss* v. *Board of Education of Knoxville*, 301 F.2d 164 (C.A.6 1962); 305 F.2d 523 (C.A.6 1962); 406 F.2d 1183 (C.A.6 1969); 444 F.2d 632 (C.A.6 1971); *motion for implementation order denied*, 403 U.S. 956 (1971); *Robinson* v. *Shelby County Board of Education*, 442 F.2d 259 (C.A.6 1971); *Mapp* v. *Board of Education of City of Chattanooga*, —— F.2d —— (C.A.6 October 11, 1972), *rehearing en banc granted* —— F.2d —— (C.A.6 1972).

the square hole that is Cincinnati in *Deal* v. *Board of Education.*[5] In *Deal*, which dealt with an urban school system organized under the laws of Ohio, there was no finding that the actions of the school board had contributed in *any* fashion to the segregation of the Cincinnati public schools. We have not found the *Keyes* situation of the transfer of whites to remaining predominately white schools.[6] We have not found the *Bradley* altered attendance zones or the transfer programs that allowed whites to escape from identifiably black neighborhood schools.[7] We have not found the *Davis* pattern of racial discrimination.[8]

What we have found are racially imbalanced schools, optional attendance zones, and recent Board action, which are cumulatively in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. We hold that the totality of these findings require intervention by this Court under the mandate of *Brown* v. *Board of Education, supra.*

We do not hold that a school board may not in its wisdom determine to establish "neighborhood schools." *Gilliam* v. *School Board of Hopewell,* 345 F.2d 325; *Deal, supra; Goss, supra.* But an "optional attendance zone" is a limitation upon this concept and if carried to an ultimate conclusion, effectively destroys it. If a school board elects to use the neighborhood school concept, it must do so fully and completely. Where

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[5] 369 F.2d 55 (C.A.6 1966); 419 F.2d 1387 (C.A.6 1969), *cert. den.* 402 U.S. 962 (1971).

[6] *Keyes* v. *School District No. 1,* 303 F.Supp. 279, 289 (D.C. Colo. 1969); 313 F.Supp. 61, 90 (D.C. Colo. 1970), *aff'd. in part, rev'd. in part,* 445 F.2d 990 (C.A.10 1971), *cert. granted* —— U.S. —— (1972).

[7] *Bradley* v. *Milliken,* 338 F.Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), *aff'd.* —— F.2d ——, Nos. 72-1809, 72-1814 (C.A.6 Dec. 8, 1972), *rehearing en banc granted* —— F.2d —— (C.A.6, Jan. 16, 1973). See also *Clemons* v. *Board of Education of Hillsboro,* 228 F.2d 853 (C.A.6 1956).

[8] *Davis* v. *School District of Pontiac,* 443 F.2d 573 (C.A.6 1971), *cert. den.* 404 U.S. 913 (1971).

there are hazards, natural or artificial, it must so adjust the boundaries in order to protect the children it intends to educate. It may not employ optional zones either to destroy or dilute the neighborhood school concept.

In addition, there appear to be aspects of the system which may in the future become segregative in effect unless steps are now taken that will retard these undesirable tendencies. Without seeking to calibrate the degree of segregation that inheres in individual policies of the Board, we hold that these must be refashioned in such manner as to avoid such future racially disharmonious potential.

Accordingly, the Dayton School Board is hereby instructed to prepare and present to this Court within sixty (60) days a plan that will accomplish the following:

(1) Abolish all optional attendance zones presently remaining within the Dayton school system;

(2) Restate the priorities for high school attendance in the freedom of enrollment plan in order that no student of a minority race may be denied attendance at any high school in the Dayton Public School System and so that transfers for purpose of improving racial balance take precedence over curriculum transfers;

(3) Maintain faculty assignment policies that will reflect in each school the approximate ratio of black to white faculty throughout the district;

(4) Establish hiring policies that will enable the clerical and maintenance personnel hired by the school board of Dayton to approximate the proportion of black-to-white ratio of the Dayton School District.

The foregoing enumerated specifics shall be considered as a minimum. The plan submitted by the defendant Board shall

in all other respects conform to the requirements of law. *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,* 402 U.S. 1 (1970); *Davis* v. *Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, Ala.,* 402 U.S. 33 (1970).

Irrespective of the determination of this Court there will remain in the city of Dayton a substantial black population entitled as a matter of law to equality in education, housing, and job opportunity. No peaceful community can consist of two separate societies viewing each other with mistrust and suspicion from ever higher walls of separation. Education has been historically in our country and remains to this day, one of the primary means of overcoming barriers of class, status and occupation.

A court can only enjoin upon a school board its legal duty. It cannot reach the infinitely more sensitive moral obligaton that defies legal measurement. We commend to the School Board of the City of Dayton its moral obligaton to provide the highest possible level of education equally for all children entrusted to its care, without distinction or bias or partiality.

/s/ CARL B. RUBIN
United States District Judge

APPENDIX A, FEBRUARY 7, 1973 FINDINGS OF FACT RACIAL COMPOSITION OF DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1971-1972)

Elementary schools — % Black:

1. Jane Addams 81.7
2. Allen 0.6
3. Belle Haven 5.0
4. Belmont 0.0
5. Brown 0.6
6. Carlson 99.0
7. Cleveland 0.0
8. Drexel 5.7
9. Eastmont 0.0
10. Edison 97.3
11. Emerson 6.8
12. Fairport 0.1
13. Fairview Elementary 1.7
14. Ft. McKinley 0.0
15. Franklin 0.0
16. Gardendale 28.5
17. Gettysburg 5.2
18. Gorman 21.1
19. U.S. Grant 0.1
20. Grace A. Greene .. 96.8
21. Hawthorne 0.0
22. Hickorydale 6.6
23. Highview 97.0
24. Huffman 0.0
25. Irving 99.0
26. Jackson Elementary 99.1
27. Jackson Primary .. 98.8
28. Jefferson Ele. 60.1
29. Jefferson Primary . 57.1
30. Kemp 0.0
31. Lewton 0.0
32. Lincoln 0.0
33. Loos 4.6
34. Horace Mann 0.2
35. McGuffey 14.4
36. McNary Park 99.4
37. Meadowdale Ele. . 8.0
38. Miami Chapel 99.9
39. Patterson-Kennedy 0.0
40. Residence Park Ele. 98.8
41. Residence Park Pri. 99.3
42. Ruskin 7.0
43. Shiloh 0.1
44. Shoup Mill 7.1
45. Louise Troy 100.0
46. Valerie 7.5
47. Van Cleve 1.1
48. Washington 19.4
49. Weaver 99.9
50. Webster 0.0
51. Westwood 99.4
52. Wogaman 100.0

Of 52 elementary schools in use as of September, 1972, 29 are more than 90% white and 15 are more than 90% black. The balance range from 19.4% to 60.1% black.

Middle schools – % Black:

1. MacFarlane 99.6
2. Whittier 99.3
3. Cornell Heights 80.5
4. Longfellow 64.1
5. Orville Wright 8.1

High Schools – % Black:

1. Dunbar 100.0
2. Roosevelt 100.0
3. Roth 95.8
4. Colonel White 54.6
5. Patterson Co-op 32.9
6. Fairview 24.1
7. Stivers 14.0
8. Meadowdale 10.6
9. Kiser 9.8
10. Wilbur Wright 9.2
11. Belmont 5.2

APPENDIX B TO FEBRUARY 7, 1973 FINDINGS OF FACT

EXISTING OPTIONAL ZONES

Optional Zone	Date of Creation	Percentage Black School Population At date of creation	1972-73
Elementary schools:			
1. Belle Haven/	1955	0.0	17.7
Fort McKinley		0.0	2.6
2. Residence Park/	1954	a.	100
Jane Addams		29.3 b.	78.7
3. Westwood Ele./	1952	0.0	99.7
Jackson Ele.		35.9	99.9
4. Lincoln/	1957	0.0	0.6
Horace Mann		0.0	3.1
5. Cleveland/	1956	0.0	0.8
Belmont Ele.		0.0	9.4
6. Grant/	1957 c.	0.0	0.3
Belmont		0.0	9.4
7. Eastmont/	1957 c.	0.0	0.7
Lewton		0.0	5.8
High schools:			
1. Fairview/	1965	0.9 c.	24.1
Roth		53.5 c.	95.8
2. Roosevelt/	1951	31.5	100.0
Colonel White	extended 1958	0.0	54.6
3. Kiser/	1962	2.7 c.	9.8
Colonel White		1.1 c.	54.6
4. Wilbur Wright/	1956	2.2 b.	9.2
Belmont High		0.0	5.2

a. Figures not available
b. Figures as of 1951
c. Figures as of 1963-1964

APPENDIX C TO FEBRUARY 7, 1973 FINDINGS OF FACT
FREEDOM OF ENROLLMENT APPLICATIONS

	1969-70 1970-71	1971-72	1972-73
White applications	133	78	47
Black applications	695	757	741
Totals	828	835	788
White approvals	50	39	23
Black approvals	421	460	460
Totals	471	499	483
White disapprovals	83	76	15
Black disapprovals	274	260	187
Totals	357	336	202
White disapprovals (Lack of classroom space)	16	8	12
Black disapprovals (Lack of classroom space)	164	174	166
Total disapprovals (Lack of classroom space)	180	182	178

APPENDIX D TO FEBRUARY 7, 1973 FINDINGS OF FACT RESOLUTIONS OF THE DAYTON SCHOOL BOARD

At the December 8, 1971, meeting of the Dayton School Board, the following three resolutions were passed, each by a 5-2 vote:

RESOLUTION SEEKING JOINT ACTION TO END SEGREGATION IN EDUCATION, HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE METROPOLITAN DAYTON AREA

WHEREAS, the Committee of 75, in reporting to this Board, has called renewed attention to the widespread racial and economic isolation of pupils in the Dayton Public Schools and in schools of the metropolitan Dayton area.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Education of the City School District of Dayton:

1. That this Board hereby recognizes and admits that racial and economic segregation exists in the Dayton schools because of the actions and inactions of this and predecessor boards in the establisment of attendance districts, the location and expansion of school buildings, pupil assignment practices, design of curriculum suitable to urban needs, the assignment of teachers and other staff, and the conduct of student activity programs; the past actions or inactions of the Ohio General Assembly, the State Board of Educaton, and other agencies of Federal, state, and local government in contributing to the development and continuation of segregated housing, education, and employment in the Dayton metropolitan area and other parts of Ohio; and the actions and inactions of lending agencies, real estate interests, employers, unions, private schools, colleges, churches, and other organizations that have reinforced segregation.

2. That this Board recognizes that past actions or inactions

of the Board of Education and residential racial segregation are interdependent phenomena.

3. That this Board recognizes that the black minority population of the Dayton metropolitan area, as illustrated by the existence of schools of opposite racial composition in districts with contiguous district lines, essentially is contained within the central city of Dayton, as a result of discriminatory practices. Such containment works against a viable integrated school system within the city, and the Board asserts that a truly effective solution is possible only through a metropolitan approach.

4. That this Board of Education recognizes that racial and economic integration of student bodies in each school is imperative to providing equal educational opportunity, a broad curriculum capable of serving the individual needs of pupils, and a democratic environment in which future citizens can be prepared to live in America's multi-ethnic society.

RESOLUTION ASKING FOR STATE ASSISTANCE TO DESEGREGATE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

WHEREAS, The Committee of 75 has recommended school integration on a metropolitan basis, and

WHEREAS, the State of Ohio has responsibility and authority for the operation of public schools, and the State Board of Education has the duty to administer the laws relating generally to the operation of the schools, and

WHEREAS, the Ohio Attorney General has ruled that the State Board of Education has the authority to restrict funding in any school district in which said Board finds as a matter of fact that racial segregation exists,

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Education of the City School District of Dayton:

1. That this Board hereby petitions the State of Ohio and the State Board of Education (a) to obtain from Ohio Civil Rights Commission, U.S. Office of Education and such other sources as it may deem useful, data on racial isolation of faculty, staffs and pupils within and among the several school districts as presently constituted in the metropolitan Dayton area; (b) to develop guidelines and criteria as may be necessary to assure an educationally and socially viable mix of pupils, within the socio-economic characteristics of the metropolitan area as a whole; (c) to require said districts to cooperate in preparing and implementing a plan for assignment of faculty, staffs and pupils in accordance with said guidelines and criteria, and (d) to assure adequate funding from state and district sources to continue the operation of the schools and the implementation of said plans throughout the period of transition and thereafter.

2. That said plans be developed by September 1, 1972 and fully implemented not later than September 1, 1973.

3. That the Clerk of the Board forward a true copy of this resolution to the Governor of the State of Ohio, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President of the Ohio Senate and the President of the State Board of Education.

• • •

RESOLUTION ORDERING THE RACIAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF PUPILS IN THE DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS

WHEREAS, the Board of Education of the Dayton City School District recognizes a moral and legal duty to provide quality non-segregated education for all students in the district, and,

WHEREAS, integrated education is vital to the achievement

of quality education for all pupils, black and white, rich and poor, and,

5. That this Board view the racial and ethnic mix of the Dayton City School District and of the metropolitan area as assets; that this population, if reflected in each school, could itself contribute to people's learning from each other; and that, as a whole, the metropolitan area represents a nearly ideal cross section of the nation that could permit schools here to become a model of American democracy in action.

6. That this Board hereby invites and urges agencies of the federal, state, and local governments and organizations of religious, business, labor, education, communications, civic service, and real estate to assist the Board in desegregation of Dayton schools and to pledge publicly their accelerated efforts to bring about desegregation in housing, education and employment throughout the Dayton metropolitan area.

7. That the Clerk of The Board be and hereby is directed to forward a true copy of this resolution to the following:

Governor of the State of Ohio
President of the State Board of Education
Speaker of the Ohio House of Representatives
President of the Ohio Senate
Montgomery County Members of the Ohio General Assembly and United States Congress.
Montgomery County Commissioners
Dayton City Commissioners
Montgomery County Council of Governments
City Plan Board
Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission
Miami Valley Regional Transit Authority
Metropolitan Housing Authority

Apartment Owners Associations
Area Progress Council

Assembly of Area Councils
Chairmen of Democratic and Republican Organizations
Community Affairs Committee
Congress of Representative East Dayton Organizations
Dayton Advisory Council on Education
Dayton Area Board of Realtors
Dayton Area Chamber of Commerce
Dayton Area Junior Chamber of Commerce
Dayton Building Trades Council
Dayton Classroom Teachers Association
Dayton-Miami Valley AFL-CIO
Dayton Model Cities Planning Council, Inc.
Dayton Public Service Union
Dayton Urban League
Deans of Area Colleges of Education
Elementary Principals Association
Metropolitan Churches United
Miami Valley Consortium of Colleges and Universities
Montgomery County Community Action Agency
Montgomery County Council of PTAs
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
Ohio Association of Public School Employees
Presidents Club
Secondary Principals Association
Southern Christian Leadership Conference

WHEREAS, the Fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education decision and subsequent court decisions place an affirmative duty to dis-establish the segregated attendance patterns which result in whole or in part from its actions and inactions in order to equalize educational opportunity, and,

WHEREAS, segregated educational opportunity and unequal educational opportunities for minority and poor students now exist in the Dayton public schools, and,

WHEREAS, this inequality exists as a result of the acts and omissions of this Board and preceding Boards in their decisions concerning the site selection of school buildings, size of school buildings, changes and adoption of school attendance boundaries, pupil assignment practices, faculty and staff hiring and assignment practices and,

WHEREAS, this Board has requested and received reports of findings and recommendations from the State Department of Education and the Committee of 75,

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Education of the City School District of Dayton that it is the policy of this Board that each school shall enroll pupils in a manner which substantially reflects the racial and economic characteristics of the district as a whole. The Board recognizes that implementation of this policy requires departure from past practices and requires special planning to assure a smooth transition. The Board therefore directs:

1. That the superintendent in consultation with professional staff and the representatives of employee organizations, design and implement a mandatory program of in-service education involving all staff members to prepare staff for changes in enrollments and to develop an individualized, multi-ethnic curriculum in each school.

2. That Dayton Advisory Council on Education be requested to organize a Community Involvement Advisory Committee and a Lay Citizens Financial Review Committee to advise the superintendent during the course of planning and implementing integration programs, as recommended by the Committee of 75.

3. That the superintendent be and hereby is directed to develop and implement plans for the racial and economic integration of pupils using the following guidelines and criteria:

a. Attendance districts as presently constituted are rescinded effective September 1, 1972.

b. No building shall have a racial composition and family income characteristics substantially disproportionate to the district as a whole.

c. After determination of building capacities and racial and economic characteristics of attendance areas, pupils will be assigned to a school in which such assignment would contribute to a mix as in b. above.

d. Freedom of Enrollment policy with the exception of transfers for course enrollment shall be eliminated by September 1, 1972.

e. Desegregation is to be completed by September, 1972.

f. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit the establishment of magnet, demonstration, specialized or other education complexes, provided that the sites for instruction meet the criterial in c. above.

g. Transportation shall be held to a minimum, but is specifically included as one means of implementing this policy.

4. That to the maximum feasible extent consistent with this policy statement, recommendations of the Committee of 75, are hereby adopted and may be used in planning and implementing school integration.

5. That the superintendent report on progress and problems concerning implementation of this policy at least every sixty days and that a program for continuous evaluation throughout the phases of implementation be developed by July 31, 1972.

6. That the superintendent prepare applications for supplementary financial assistance from state, federal and other sources that may become available to improve the quality of education and achieve the goals of the Committee of 75 report.

B. JULY 13, 1973 SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REMEDY OF DISTRICT COURT

(Filed July 13, 1973)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Civil No. 72-137

MARK BRINKMAN, et al,

Plaintiffs

v.

JOHN J. GILLIGAN, Governor
of the State of Ohio, et al,

Defendants

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER ON REMEDY

Pursuant to order of this Court dated February 7, 1973, the defendant School Board of the City of Dayton has submitted a desegregation plan for consideration. A separate plan has been submitted by the minority members of the Dayton School Board, as has one by the Dayton Classroom Teachers' Association, whose motion to file as amicus curiae in this matter is hereby GRANTED. Exhaustive memoranda have likewise been filed by interested parties. The matter is now before the court for determination.

The plan submitted by the defendant Board contains eleven points: Four are directed to the specific requirements imposed by this Court and seven are in response to the Court's sug-

gestion that additional action be undertaken. Such additional action was not specifcally mandated by the Court. We do, however, note our disappintment at the limited nature of Points V through XI. While defendant School Board can assert that it was not required by the Court to go as far as it has, a response can be made with equal accuracy that the community relies on the elected members of the School Board to approach the present problem in a sensitive and understanding fashion. The Board's proposals, unfortunately, do not convince us that they have completely attained this desired goal.

We turn to the four points of the plan required by the Court's order. Point I eliminates the optional zones and their attendant segregatory effects. Point III provides for non-racially based faculty assignment practices. Point IV provides for the proper hiring policies of classified personnel. Points I, III and IV are in accord with the requirements of the Court's previous order and as to them, the plan of defendant School Board of the City of Dayton is hereby APPROVED.

Point II, however, which deals with Freedom of Enrollment Priorities, does not entirely meet the required standards. It will be conditionally accepted for elementary schools and middle schools for the school year 1973-74. It will not be accepted for the high schools.

As to the Dayton high schools, the Board is hereby directed to achieve the following:

(1) Any student eligible to attend a Dayton public high school may attend any high school within the Dayton Public School district, provided that students presently enrolled in high schools shall have first priority to complete their education therein.

(2) Each incoming ninth grade class and all vacancies in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth grade classes shall be filed from those pupils seeking admission. Where there is insufficient capacity for all pupils seeking admission, a random selection plan shall be used.

(3) Only insufficient capacity shall be deemed reason to exclude any applying pupil.

(4) Transportation shall be the responsibility of the Board of Education for all students eligible and approved for transfer outside of the attendance area of such students' residences.

The defendant Board of Education will submit to this Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order a revised plan to comply with the above. Included in such plan will be a listing of the pupil capacity by grade of each of the high schools within the Dayton Public School District. Plaintiffs will be granted an opportunity to present evidence as to such capacity. The foregoing admission plan shall not apply to the Patterson-Stivers Vocational High School.

There remain for consideration two further questions which the Court has reserved: The matter of the so-called Metropolitan School District and the status of defendants State of Ohio through its Governor and the Ohio Department of Education.

The findings by the Court in its Order of February 7, 1973, and the disposition of the Board of Education's plan appear to moot the metropolitan question and to require the dismissal of these non-Dayton defendants. Plaintiffs are hereby granted thirty (30) days within which to file memoranda on either or both of these questions. Defendants are granted thirty (30) days from the date of such filing to file answer memoranda and plaintiffs are granted thirty (30) days from defendants' filing to file reply memoranda. An evidentiary hearing will be granted upon either of such questions upon the showing of a need therefor.

This supplemental Order has been delayed pending study of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in *Keyes* v. *School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,* —— U.S. ——, 42 U.S.L.W. 5002 (June 21, 1973). The *Keyes* case dealt, for the first time, with a large northern city whose school

system had never been operated under mandatory segregation laws, but which had nevertheless acted in a way that helped create a racially segregative system. It is significant both as a major landmark in the continuing definition of the Equal Protection clause within the context of school desegregation that began with *Brown* v. *Board of Education,* 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and as an indication of the views and attitude of the present Supreme Court. It will of necessity have a major impact upon the future direction of the public school systems in the United States including the one in Dayton, Ohio.

The concurring opinion of Justice Powell must rank among the clearest and most logical expositions of a most troubling and difficult subject. This court proposes to follow the rationale set forth by Justice Powell. We place the burden upon the Board to comply to the fullest extent possible with the views stated therein. We place particular significance on the following statement of Justice Powell:

> "The Term, 'integrated school system,' presupposes, of course, a total absence of any laws, regulations or policies supportive of the type of 'legalized' segregation condemned in *Brown.*
>
> "A system would be integrated in accord with constitutional standards if the responsible authorities had taken appropriate steps to: (i) integrate faculties and administration; (ii) scrupulously assure equality of facilities, instructions and curricula opportunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their authority to draw attendance zones to promote integration; and (iv) locate new schools, close to old ones, and determine the size and grade categories with the same objective in mind. Where school authorities decide to undertake the transportation of students, this also must be with integrative opportunities in mind."

This Court likewise adopts as its guiding definition the following statement from Justice Powell:

> "An integrated school system does not mean, and indeed could not mean, in view of the residential patterns of most of our major metropolitan areas, that *every school* must in fact be an integrated unit. A school which happens to be all or predominately white or all or predominately black is not a 'segregated' school in an unconstitutional sense if the system itself is a genuinely integrated one."

Keyes v. *School District No. 1, Denver, supra,* 41 U.S.L.W. at 5012.

Relating the standards established by Justice Powell to the Dayton situation, the Court has found that appropriate steps to integrate faculties and administration have been instituted and will be continued. There has been and there will be an increasing level of transportation of students for the purpose of promoting integrative opportunities through the Freedom of Enrollment priorities.

There is presently no evidence of a failure of equality of facilities, instructions and curricula opportunities nor has there been a persuasive proof that the Board, in recent times, drew attendance lines or built new facilities for the avowed purpose of minimizing integration. However, there has been evidence which indicates that the affirmative promotion of integration through these essential functions of the Board has not held an important place in the Board's priorities.

The Powell rationale will operate prospectively. The Board's planning and implementation units must become capable of and sensitive to the racial effects which flow from the drawing of attendance lines, the construction and improvement of school facilities and the assignment of faculty, staff and pupils. All of such actions must henceforth be examined for their "integration impact."

These are long range goals and a further opportunity should be given to the Dayton School Board in which to plan and implement them. Accordingly, while this Court is most re-

luctant to continue a "federal receivership" of the Dayton School System, see *Keyes* v. *School District No. 1, Denver, supra,* 41 U.S.L.W. 5022 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting), it would seem that a proper disposition of this problem requires a retention of jurisdiction while a reasonable period of time is given to the School Board for this purpose. Therefore, as to these long-range criteria, the Court will re-examine the Dayton School System at the end of academic year 1973-74 and determine, at that time, whether or not additional judicial action is required.

Nothing that we have said today should be interpreted as a repudiation of the neighborhood school concept. To the contrary, it is this concept which often represents the bedrock strength of the public school systems and steps may be properly taken to preserve it. See *Keyes* v. *School District No. 1, Denver, supra,* 41 U.S.L.W. 5018-5020 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); *Deal* v. *Cincinnati Board of Education,* 396 F.2d 55, 60 (C.A.6 1966). Where school lines in Dayton have been drawn without improper racial intent, they will be allowed to stand. Where they have not yet been drawn, as in the case of the still embryonic system of middle schools, they should be drawn in such a way as to maximize integrative goals.

The essential principle which guides this Court is a paraphrase from *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,* 402 U.S. 1 at pages 15-16.

It is the function of the federal courts only to eliminate a deprivation of constitutional rights; it is the duty of local school boards to operate and maintain integrated school systems.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ CARL B. RUBIN
United States District Judge

C. AUGUST 20, 1974 OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS

(Filed August 20, 1974)

Nos. 73-1974-75

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MARK BRINKMAN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

JOHN J. GILLIGAN, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.

MARK BRINKMAN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

DAYTON BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants-Appellants.

APPEAL from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and PECK and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge. This is a school desegregation case directed against the public school system of Dayton, Ohio. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs-appellants are black and white Dayton parents who bring this class action on their own behalf, on behalf of their minor children, and on behalf of all others similarly situated.

In addition, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) joined as a party plaintiff. The complaint named the Governor of Ohio, the Attorney General of Ohio, the Ohio State Board of Education, the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Ohio Department of Education, the Dayton Board of Education, the six individual members of the Dayton Board and the Superintendent of the Dayton School District as parties defendants.[1] The Dayton Board of Education has cross appealed.

I. Chronology of Proceedings

In their complaint filed on April 17, 1972, appellants sought, *inter alia*, an injunction enjoining the Dayton defendants from continuing their allegedly unconstitutional policy of operating the public schools in Dayton in a manner that perpetuated racial segregation. The complaint further averred numerous racially discriminatory practices for which the State defendants had allocated educational resources.

The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, which is located at Columbus, Ohio, rather than in the Western Division at Dayton (the situs of the subject schools) on the basis that the State defendants were domiciled in Franklin County (Columbus). Motions to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties and for improper venue and alternative motions to transfer the action to the District Court at Dayton were filed by the State defendants, the Dayton Board of Education and three individual Dayton Board members. On June 22, 1972, the District Court overruled the motions to dismiss for improper venue and denied the motions to transfer, but did not

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[1] Hereinafter, the Governor, Attorney General, State Board of Education, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction will sometimes be referred to collectively as the "State defendants." Hereinafter, the Dayton Board of Education, its members, and its Superintendent sometimes will be referred to collectively as the "Dayton defendants."

rule on the motion to dismiss for want of necessary parties. Thereafter, on July 24, 1972, the Dayton defendants and the State defendants filed their answers denying the material allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint.

In accordance with the proposed order of procedure, an expedited hearing before District Judge Carl B. Rubin was conducted from November 13 through December 1, 1972, limited to the single issue of whether the school system of Dayton was a segregated one by reason of acts of the Daton Board of Education. On February 7, 1973, the District Court filed its Findings of Fact and Memorandum Opinion of Law in which it found that (1) racially imbalanced schools, (2) optional attendance zones, and (3) rescission by the Dayton Board of Education of three resolutions calling for racial and economic balance in each school in the Dayton system were "cumulatively in violation of the Equal Protection Clause" of the Constitution. In its February 7, 1973, decision, the District Court ordered the Dayton Board to submit a plan which would (1) abolish all optional zones, (2) restate the priorities of the Board's Freedom of Enrollment program so that racial transfers would take precedence over curriculum transfers, (3) maintain faculty assignment practices so that each school would continue to reflect the approximate ratio of the total black to white faculty in the Dayton system, and (4) establish hiring practices that would enable the clerical and maintenance personnel employed by the Board to approximate the proportion of black-to-white population existing within the Dayton system. The District Court further stated that the foregoing elements "shall be considered as a minimum" and that the plan to be submitted by the Board should otherwise conform in all respects to the requirements of law, citing *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) and *Davis* v. *Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County*, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).

In compliance with the February 7, 1973, order of the District Court, the Dayton Board on March 19, 1973, submitted

a desegregation plan to the District Court. This plan contained eleven points which are summarized below:

I. Elimination of Optional Zones – eliminated optional attendance zones for elementary and high school students.

II. Freedom of Enrollment Priorities – revised the system's Freedom of Enrollment program in accordance with a specified set of priorities.

III. Faculty Assignment Practices – provided that faculty assignments for each school in the system should reflect the ratio of white to black faculty in the entire system.

IV. Hiring Policies for Classified Personnel – provided that blacks would be hired for classified positions, e.g. clerical, custodial and food service staff, to reflect the proportion of the black-to-white population residing within the Dayton School District.

V. Science Environmental Program – proposed the establishment of a city-wide elementary science program guided by a trained staff working at four centers. The program was to be mandatory and children were to be bused to produce a racial mix that approximates the ratio between black and white students in the system as a whole.

VI. Patterson-Stivers Vocational High School – combined two existing vocational schools into a new unified cooperative school with a district-wide attendance area.

VII. The Musical Stereopticon – formed an elementary and high school band orchestra and chorus on an all-city basis.

VIII. Integrated Athletics – required schools that have no minorities on their teams to schedule schools that do have minorities represented. High school schedules were to be administered by a central athletic office to insure that racial isolation did not exist.

IX. Minority Language Program – required all classroom teachers and administrators at the elementary school level to participate in a series of in-service workshops on linguistic differences that exist in American English.

X. Living Arts Center – created departments in art, creative writing, dance and drama to permit students, teachers, and parents to expand their knowledge in these areas.

XI. Control Centers – created rumor control centers, school guidance centers, and area learning centers to create a more secure climate for quality education in the school system.

In addition to the plan submitted by the Dayton Board, separate plans were submitted to the District Court by the minority members of the Dayton Board and the Dayton Classroom Teachers' Association. The Board minority submitted its more comprehensive plan because it believed that the plan of the Board majority would maintain the status quo and hence did not comply with the February 7, 1973, order of the District Court to conform in all respects with *Swann, supra,* and *Davis supra.* Further, the plaintiffs-appellants filed objections to the plan of the Board majority primarily on the grounds that the majority plan "froze in" the present unconstitutional system of segregation and would fail to eliminate racially identifiable schools when other alternative remedies, such as busing of children to other schools, were available.

On July 13, 1973, after considering the three desegregation plans before it, the District Court issued its Supplemental Order on Remedy. The District Court essentially accepted the plan of the Board majority except that the Dayton Board was ordered to submit a freedom of choice plan for the Dayton high schools. The District Court, however, expressed its "disappointment at the limited nature of Points V through XI"

of the plan of the Board majority, and stated that the desired goal was not attained completely by the majority plan.

The District Court then stated:

> "There remain for consideration two further questions which the Court has reserved: The matter of the so-called Metropolitan School District and the status of defendants State of Ohio through its Governor and the Ohio Department of Education.
>
> "The findings by the Court in its Order of February 7, 1973, and the disposition of the Board of Education's plan appear to moot the metropolitan question and to require the dismissal of these non-Dayton defendants. Plaintiffs are hereby granted thirty (30) days within which to file memoranda on either or both of these questions. Defendants are granted thirty (30) days from the date of such filing to file answer memoranda and plaintiffs are granted thirty (30) days from defendants' fiiling to file reply memoranda. An evidentiary hearing will be granted upon either of such questions upon the showing of a need therefor."

The District Court concluded its July 13, 1973, order as follows:

> "Nothing that we have said today should be interpreted as a repudiation of the neighborhood school concept. To the contrary, it is this concept which often represents the bedrock strength of public school systems and steps may be properly taken to preserve it. See *Keyes* v. *School District No. 1, Denver, supra,* 41 U.S.L.W. 5013-5020 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); *Deal* v. *Cincinnati Board of Education,* 396 F.2d 55, 60 (C.A. 6 1966). Where school lines in Dayton have been drawn without improper racial intent, they will be allowed to stand. Where they have not yet been drawn, as in the case of the still embryonic system of middle schools, they should be drawn in such a way as to maximize integrative goals.

"The essential principle which guides this Court is a paraphrase from *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,* 402 U.S. 1 at pages 15-16.

"It is the function of the federal courts only to eliminate a deprivation of constitutional rights; it is the duty of local school boards to operate and maintain integrated school systems."

Following the July 13, 1973, order of the District Court, the plaintiffs-appellants in a letter dated July 26, 1973, reminded the District Court that by its own order of procedure evidence with respect to the metropolitan and state aspects of the controversy had been excluded from the earlier hearing. On August 10, 1973, the Dayton Board submitted a revised plan incorporating the court's freedom of choice plan for the Dayton high schools. The plaintiffs-appellants filed their notice of appeal from the two orders of the District Court on July 23, 1973. The Dayton Board cross appealed from those orders on August 13, 1973.

Thereafter, on September 25, 1973, the Dayton Board moved this court to dismiss the pending appeal of the plaintiffs-appellants for want of jurisdiction on the ground that no final order had been entered by the District Court. In an unreported order filed on January 17, 1974, this court denied the Dayton Board's motion to dismiss, saying:

"Said motion to dismiss is hereby denied, it appearing to the court that the District Judge's supplemental order on remedy, dated July 13, 1973, approves a proposed desegregation plan with added instruction as to how it is to be carried into effect, and hence, appears to be in the nature of a temporary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1) (1970)."

We have heard oral arguments and the case is now before the court for decision.

II. Historical Background of School Segregation in Dayton

Ohio law has long mandated an integrated public school system. Ohio Revised Code, § 3313.48, provides in relevant part:

> "The board of education, of each city, exempted village, local, and joint vocational school district shall provide for the free education of the youth of school age within the district under its jurisdiction, at such places as will be most convenient for the attendance of the largest number thereof."

This has been the law of Ohio since February 22, 1887, when it was enacted by 84 Ohio Laws 34. That statute was upheld by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1888 in *Board of Education* v. *State*, 45 Ohio St. 555, 556, 16 N.E. 373, in which the court stated:

> "[S]ection 4008 having been repealed by the act of the general assembly passed February 22, 1887 (84 Ohio L. 34), separate schools for colored children have been abolished and no regulation can be made under section 4013, that does not apply to all children irrespective of race or color."

Further, the District Court made the following historical determination, that is not challenged on appeal, as a finding of fact:

> "(1) The evidence presented has established isolated but repeated instances of failure by the Dayton School Board to meet the standards of the Ohio law mandating an integrated school system. Such instances include a physical segregation into separate buildings of pupils and teachers by race at the Garfield School in the early 1920's, a denial to blacks of access to swimming pools in high schools in the 1930's and 1940's and the exclusion, between 1938 and 1948, of black high school teams from the city athletic conference." (Footnotes omitted.)

The physical segregation into separate buildings of pupils and teachers by race was ruled illegal in *Board of Education of School District of City of Dayton* v. *State, ex rel. Reese,* 114 Ohio St. 188, 189, 151 N.E. 39 (1926).

In 1956, following *Brown* v. *Board of Education,* 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Ohio Attorney General ruled that the Ohio State Board of Education had the primary responsibility for administering the laws relating to the distribution of state and federal funds to local school districts and that such funds should not be distributed, absent good and sufficient reasons, by the State Board to local school districts which segregated pupils on the basis of race in violation of *Brown.* Despite protests over the past twenty years from the Dayton branch of the NAACP and others, the Dayton Board has maintained a system wherein the great majority of schools today have student populations which are racially imbalanced. The State Board of Education has permitted this system to continue with a steady flow of state and federal money.

On March 17, 1969, the Acting Director of the Office for Civil Rights, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), notified the Dayton School authorities that, as a result of a compliance review conducted by federal officials, his office had concluded that the Dayton school district was not complying with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In particular, the Acting Director stated:

> "An analysis of the data obtained during the review establishes that your district pursues a policy of racially motivated assignment of teachers and other professional staff. Thus, all Negro principals are assigned to predominantly Negro schools, as are 11 of the 14 Negro assistant principals; 156 out of 181 Negro high school teachers are assigned to schools where Negroes constitute 92 percent of the total enrollment. Over 85 percent of the Negro elementary teachers instruct in schools having a preponderence of Negro pupils, and only 14 percent of teachers

of the white race are in schools where Negroes are in the majority. The assignment of counsellors and coaches follows a similar pattern.

"The existence in your district of a substantial duality in terms of race or color with respect to distribution of pupils in the various schools, is a matter of concern to us. The fact appears to be that of a total of 5,627 Negro high school pupils, approximately 85 percent are concentrated in 3 high schools in which the percentage of Negro attendence ranges from 92.3 percent to 100 percent. Similarly, 15,479 (approximately 85 percent) Negro elementary pupils attend 20 out of the 53 elementary schools in your district. It is noteworthy that in 17 of these 20 schools, Negroes constitute 90-100 percent of the total enrollment.

"Our review also indicates that students at Roosevelt High School are not afforded the same educational opportunity as other students in your system."

On June 7, 1971, the Ohio State Department of Education presented a series of recommendations to the Dayton Board on how to achieve constitutionally required desegregation. In its letter conveying the recommendations, a State Department of Education report stated:

"As the resolution of April 29, 1971 (of the Dayton Board), admitted, 'the Dayton Board of Education recognizes that unequal educational opportunities for minority students now exists.' Inequality of such opportunities, for minority *and* majority students, has characterized the Dayton public school system throughout its history.

"Since the Board, *as an agency of state government*, has created the inequality which offends the Constitution, the Ohio State Department of Education must advise that the Dayton Board of Education clearly has an affirmative

duty to comply with the Constitution; that is, as the Supreme Court has stated, 'to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.' "

In particular, the State Department report was especially critical of the process of conversion to feeder and middle schools, stating that the following seemed to be occurring:

"1. two sets of schools will be totally black;

"2. racial isolation will actually be increased in one set of schools; and

"3. only in the Dayton View area, which was previously integrated, could conversion to middle schools possibly result in reduction of racial and economic isolation and insulation.

"If what appears to be happening with middle schools is in fact happening, then Dayton has only added one more action to a long list of state-imposed activities which are offensive to the Constitution and which are degrading to schoolchildren. Along with many other affirmative duties which the Dayton Board must fulfill, correction of this particular offense must occur."

Although the recommendations of the State Department were not complied with in full, the State Board of Education continued to aid in financing the operation of Dayton schools.

Finally, pursuant to the resolution of the Dayton Board passed at its April 29, 1971, meeting, the President of the Dayton Board appointed a broadly representative committee to evaluate and advise the Board on plans to reduce racial isolation and improve educational opportunities in Dayton. This committee became known as the Committee of 75, although its membership was later expanded to include eleven students. At its first meeting, on August 30, 1971, the Committee was charged as follows by the Board President:

"We recognize, and the statistical data substantiates, the fact that unequal educational opportunities for the poor and black students now exist in the Dayton School District. The Board of Education has gone on record by setting quality integrated education as its goal. We have admitted that the district is guilty of procedures which have led to the racial isolation of school children.

"It is this committe's responsibility to establish the evaluation elements to be applied to a developed plan or plans and advise the Dayton Board of Education accordingly. We do hope that you would set up guidelines and/or methods by which the community will become meaningfully involved.

"You are an arm of the Dayton Board of Education with the task of supplying input to the Board. It remains the responsibility of the Board of Education to make official approval of your input. We feel very strongly that the establishment of this committee is not an attempt to abdicate its responsibility or delegate its authority, but rather an attempt to utilize the enrichment of citizen participation. It is hoped that the school councils, and organized groups of school-oriented citizens of the school district, will be an avenue you may use for additional participation.

"If there be a fear that you are here to architect a master plan for 'busing' – 't'ain't true.' You are here in an attempt to supply your input of the ingredients for excellency to any plan that the administration and/or consultants may recommend. It is our sincere hope that when a plan is set for implementation, it should be that one or the one that embraces the wishes of the citizens of the Dayton School District and not one imposed by federal, state or court mandate."

After several months of study, the Committee of 75 issued its report in the late fall of 1971. The report recognized the

Dayton Board's casual responsibility for the condition of segregation and the imperative need to end one race schooling, and suggested the following tentative approaches to accomplish desegregation in the Dayton school system:

"1. Segregated education, because it perpetuates and condones economic and racial isolation, is both illegal and inferior.

"2. The school children of Dayton have suffered far too long under the crippling handicaps imposed by racial and economic isolation.

"3. We must resolve now as a total community to end inferior segregated education once and for all.

"4. Time is running out. Unless we act now the divisions generated by segregation will destroy us. Unless we act now court orders may impose upon us what all of us will regret.

"5. Initiative in the struggle against segregated education belongs to the Dayton Board of Education. We cannot wait for housing and job patterns to change while we defy the law of the land.

"6. To lift the plague of segregated education in Dayton immediate appeal must be addressed to the school systems surrounding Dayton as well as to the appropriate state and national agencies involved.

"7. Desegregation is not enough. To end racial and economic isolation we must not rest until we have achieved true integration, until the differing ethnic and racial groups among us are able to live side by side in mutual respect.

"8. The personal cost of achieving such true integration will be high because to achieve such integration we must persist in dialogue until the differences that divide us have been resolved. We can no longer allow the fear of busing (to) stifle such dialogue.

"9. The financial cost of true integration will also be high. At least 1 per cent of the current budget, exclusive of federal and state grants, should be allocated to this sector.

"10. Integrated quality education requires constant vigilance. We must not only develop support systems to undergird every group involved in the changes proposed but we must nurture these groups by continuing attention to curricula, buildings, and in-service training."

The report of the Committee of 75 concluded as follows:

"*Summary.* The presence and magnitude of the problem before us needs to be recognized by all the citizens of Dayton. Quality integrated education can help stop the flight to the suburbs, break the cycle of poor education, and the lack of job skills which handicap the minorities. The cost of this type of education will be small in relation to the total benefits society will reap."

Thereafter, at its regular meeting on December 8, 1971, the Dayton Board of Education passed three resolutions in response to the report of the Committee of 75. The first resolution provided, in part, as follows:

"WHEREAS, the Committee of 75, in reporting to this Board, has called renewed attention to the widespread racial and economic isolation of pupils in the Dayton Public Schools and in schools of the metropolitan Dayton area.

"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Education of the City School District of Dayton:

"1. That this Board hereby recognizes and admits that racial and economic segregation exists in the Dayton schools because of the actions and inactions of this and predecessor boards in the establishment of attendance districts, the location and expansion of school buildings, pupil assignment practices, design of cur-

riculum suitable to urban needs, the assignment of teachers and other staff, and the conduct of student activity programs; the past actions or inactions of the Ohio General Assembly, the State Board of Education, and other agencies of Federal, state, and local government in contributing to the development and continuation of segregated housing, education, and employment in the Dayton metropolitan area and other parts of Ohio; and the actions or inactions of lending agencies, real estate interests, employers, unions, private schools, colleges, churches, and other organizations that have reinforced segregation.

"2. That this Board recognizes that past actions or inactions of the Board of Education and residential racial segregation are interdependent phenomena.

"3. That this Board recognizes that the black minority population of the Dayton metropolitan area, as illustrated by the existence of schools of opposite racial composition in districts with contiguous district lines, essentially is contained within the central city of Dayton, as a result of discriminatory practices. Such containment works against a viable integrated school system within the city, and the Board asserts that a truly effective solution is possible only through a metropolitan approach.

"4. That this Board of Education recognizes that racial and economic integration of student bodies in each school is imperative to providing equal educational opportunity, a broad curriculum capable of serving the individual needs of pupils, and a democratic environment in which future citizens can be prepared to live in America's multi-ethnic society."

The second resolution passed by the Dayton Board at its December 8, 1971, meeting requested the assistance of the state and federal governments in desegregating Dayton public schools. The third resolution declared the Board policy to be that each school in the system should enroll pupils in a manner

which substantially reflected the racial and economic characteristics of the district as a whole and directed the school superintendent to implement a plan of desegregation according to the following guidelines:

"a. Attendance districts as presently constituted are rescinded effective September 1, 1972.

"b. No building shall have a racial composition and family income characteristics substantially disproportionate to the district as a whole.

"c. After determination of building capacities and racial and economic characteristics of attendance areas, pupils will be assigned to a school in which such assignment would contribute to a mix as in b. above.

"d. Freedom of Enrollment policy with the exception of transfers for course enrollment shall be eliminated by September 1, 1972.

"e. Desegregation is to be completed by September, 1972.

"f. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit the establishment of magnet, demonstration, specialized or other education complexes, provided that the sites for instruction meet the criteria in c. above.

"g. Transportation shall be held to a minimum, but is specifically included as one means of implementing this policy."

Each of the three Board resolutions passed by a 5 to 2 vote after a motion to table the resolution had failed by a 4 to 3 vote.

Subsequently, on January 3, 1972, the newly constituted Dayton Board, the composition of which had been changed by the local elections of November 1971, officially rescinded the three resolutions passed by the prior Board at its December 8, 1971 meeting. The rescission of the three resolutions occurred by votes, respectively, of 4 to 3, 4 to 2, and 4 to 2. The effect of the rescissions was to reinstate the existing attendance zones and the system's Freedom of Enrollment program for

the 1972-73 school year. The present action was filed on April 17, 1972.

III. The Constitutional Violations Found by the District Court

The District Court found three constitutional violations in the Dayton school system, namely, (A) racially imbalanced schools, (B) optional attendance zones, and (C) the Dayton Board's rescission of the three resolutions. These were held by the District Court to be "cumulatively in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Further, the District Court stated that the rescission of the resolutions "constituted an independent violation" of the constitutional rights of the black minority in Dayton.

We hold that the findings of fact on which the District Court based its conclusion of a cumulative violation are not clearly erroneous but, to the contrary, are amply supported by the evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). However, we do not pass upon the question at the present time as to whether the rescission of the Board resolutions in and of itself constituted an independent violation of the Constitution.

(A) Racially Imbalanced Schools

The District Judge made the following finding of fact:

> "The great majority of all schools in the Dayton system today have student populations which are racially imbalanced, consistent with the black-white population and geographical distribution thereof as shown by the 1970 census. Except at the Patterson Co-op High School, where in the past few years a concerted effort has been made to enroll more black students, no effort has been made by the school board of Dayton to balance by race the student population at any particular school." (Footnote omitted.)

With respect to this finding of fact, the District Judge appended the following chart which graphically demonstrates the racial imbalance in Dayton's sixty-eight public schools.

RACIAL COMPOSITION OF DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1971-1972)

Elementary schools — % Black:

1.	Jane Addams	81.7	27.	Jackson Primary	98.8
2.	Allen	0.6	28.	Jefferson Ele.	60.1
3.	Belle Haven	5.0	29.	Jefferson Primary	57.1
4.	Belmont	0.8	30.	Kemp	0.0
5.	Brown	0.6	31.	Lewton	0.0
6.	Carlson	99.0	32.	Lincoln	0.0
7.	Cleveland	0.0	33.	Loos	4.6
8.	Drexel	5.7	34.	Horace Mann	0.2
9.	Eastmont	0.0	35.	McGuffey	14.4
10.	Edison	97.3	36.	McNary Park	99.4
11.	Emerson	6.8	37.	Meadowdale Ele.	8.0
12.	Fairport	0.1	38.	Miami Chapel	99.9
13.	Fairview Ele.	1.7	39.	Patterson-Kennedy	0.0
14.	Ft. McKinley	0.0	40.	Residence Park Ele.	98.8
15.	Franklin	0.0	41.	Residence Park Pri.	99.3
16.	Gardendale	28.5	42.	Ruskin	7.0
17.	Gettysburg	5.2	43.	Shiloh	0.1
18.	Gorman	21.1	44.	Shoup Mill	7.1
19.	U.S. Grant	0.1	45.	Louise Troy	100.0
20.	Grace A. Greene	96.8	46.	Valerie	7.5
21.	Hawthorne	0.0	47.	Van Cleve	1.1
22.	Hickorydale	6.6	48.	Washington	19.4
23.	Highview	97.0	49.	Weaver	99.9
24.	Huffman	0.0	50.	Webster	0.0
25.	Irving	99.0	51.	Westwood	99.4
26.	Jackson Ele.	99.1	52.	Wogaman	100.0

Of 52 elementary schools in use as of September, 1972, 29 are more than 90% white and 15 are more than 90% black. The balance range from 19.4% to 60.1% black.

Middle schools – % Black:

1. MacFarlane 99.6
2. Whittier 99.3
3. Cornell Heights ... 80.5
4. Longfellow 64.1
5. Orville Wright ... 8.1

High Schools – % Black:

1. Dunbar 100.0
2. Roosevelt 100.0
3. Roth 95.8
4. Colonel White 54.6
5. Patterson Co-op ... 32.9
6. Fairview 24.1
7. Stivers 14.0
8. Meadowdale 10.6
9. Kiser 9.8
10. Wilbur Wright 9.2
11. Belmont 5.2

Enrollment data from the Dayton system reveals the substantial lack of progress that has been made over the past 23 years in integrating the Dayton school system. In 1951-52, of 47 schools, 38 had student enrollments 90 percent or more one race (4 black, 34 white). Of the 35,000 pupils in the district, 19 per cent were black. Yet over half of all black pupils were enrolled in the four *all* black schools; and 77.6 per cent of all pupils were assigned to virtual one race schools. "Virtual one race schools" refers to schools with student enrollments 90 per cent or more one race. In 1963-64, of 64 schools, 57 had student enrollments 90 per cent or more one race (13 black, 44 white). Of the 57,400 pupils in the district, 27.8 per cent were black. Yet 79.2 per cent of all black pupils were enrolled in the 13 black schools; and 88.8 per cent of all pupils were enrolled in such one race schools.

In 1971-72 (the year the complaint was filed), of 69 schools, 49 had student enrollments 90 per cent or more one race (21 black, 28 white). Of the 54,000 pupils, 42.7 per cent were black; and 75.9 per cent of all black students were assigned to the 21 black schools. In 1972-73 (the year the hearing was held) of 68 schools, 47 were virtually one race (22 black, 25 white); fully 80 per cent of all classrooms were virtually one race. (Of the 50,000 pupils in the district, 44.6 per cent were black).

Every school which was 90 per cent or more black in 1951-52 *or* 1963-64 *or* 1971-72 and which is still in use today remains 90 per cent or more black. Of the 25 white schools in 1972-73, *all* opened 90 per cent or more white and, if open, were 90 per cent or more white in 1971-72, 1963-64 and 1951-52.

(B) Optional Attendance Zones

The District Judge made the following finding of fact:

> "(11) The Board of Education of the Dayton School District has from time to time created optional zones. Optional zones are dual or overlapping attendance areas which allow children residing within them a choice among two or more schools. Some optional attendance zones were created where the more distant school geographically had better access; some were created where the more distant school did not require the crossing of busy intersections, commercial areas, or railroad tracks. Many were created for the convenience of parents. There has been evidence that at times this last concept embraced desires motivated by racial considerations. Seven optional elementary zones and four optional high school zones exist at the present time. All of the others have been abolished.
>
> "The majority of optional zones had no racial significance at the time of their creation. The Westwood-Jackson, Roosevelt-Colonel White, and Fairview-Roth

zones may have constituted exceptions to this general rule and we cannot conclude that these did not have adverse racial effects. Similarly, although none of the elementary school optional zones today have any significant potential effects in terms of increased racial separation, the same cannot be said of the high school optional zones. Two of these zones, those between Roosevelt and Colonel White and between Kiser and Colonel White, are by far the largest in the system and have had the most demonstrable racial effects in the past."

The testimony of Dr. Gordon Foster, Director of the Florida School Desegregation Consulting Center at the University of Miami, indicates that the Colonel White-Roosevelt optional attendance area is almost a classic example of segregation practice:

"Q Dr. Foster, with reference, first of all, to the option attendance zones, you described certain effects.

Are there short term as well as long term effects of the utilization of optional attendance zones?

"A Yes. In the ones we talked about at the high school level, if we can cite the Roosevelt-Colonel White optional zone, and the following Colonel White-Kiser optional zone, the short term effect it seems to me is to allow whites to move out of a school assignment that is becoming black, and I should point out that this is not to say that in many cases that at a certain point blacks also take advantage of this option.

"In the Colonel White-Kiser situation, for example, as Colonel White has become blacker, we are at the point where there are no whites apparently opting now to go to Colonel White."

Further testimony of Dr. Foster demonstrates the deleterious effect that the optional attendance zones had on school integration in Dayton:

"Q In what way do optional attendance areas affect desegregation and the stability of pupil assignment to particular schools?

"A. Well, essentially in my opinion they create instability in the public in one way in terms of housing choices where there are choices and in terms of perception of whether a school is going black or staying white, this sort of thing, so that generally where you have an optional zone which has racial implications, you have an unstable situation that everybody realizes is in a changing environment. So, what it usually does is simply accelerate whatever process is going on or work toward the acceleration of the changing situation.

"Q. The optional attendance zones which you have identified in your testimony today, what is your opinion with respect to the effect or if there is any effect on racial composition of schools in Dayton?

"A. Well, in my opinion, these accelerated and precipitated further segregation, and in those cases where I was able to cite hard figures, I think that is very definitely borne out, and I have no reason to believe that in all the other cases the same thing was true although I can't cite actual pupil figures from year to year because they simply aren't available."

We conclude that the District Court correctly found that the optional attendance zones used in Dayton were an element of the cumulative violation of the constitutional rights of the appellants.

(C) Rescission of the Board's Resolutions

The District Judge rendered the following as a finding of fact:

"At the general election in November, 1971, the electors of the school district of Dayton elected three members for a four year term commencing January 1, 1972. Issues

at such election involved the matter of school attendance zones and transportation of pupils. Two incumbent members of the Board ran for reelection, one did not. One incumbent was reelected and two new members of the Board were added. On December 8, 1971, the 1971 Board met to consider resolutions dealing with transportation of students and zone attendance lines. All members present were duly elected, qualified and acting members of the Board, although two of them were so-called 'lame ducks,' who would not be members of the Board after December 31, 1971.

"The Board adopted several resolutions. These resolutions recognized the existence of racial segregation in the Dayton schools, the role played by the Board in the creation of the racial patterns and the concommitant responsibility of the Board to eradicate these patterns through affirmative action. The types of affirmative action recognized included the elimination of the old attendance zones and the transportation of students for the purpose of achieving the city-wide racial balance of students. . . .

"Immediately thereafter, one member of the Board who had voted with the majority, requested reconsideration and was improperly ruled out of order. The Board met subsequently on December 6, 1971 [sic], and January 3, 1972. At the end of the latter meeting, the Board ended its term of office and the 1972 Board took its place. On January 3, at its first meeting, the 1972 Board rescinded the resolutions passed on December 8. Since the 1971 Board had passed out of existence, the action of the 1972 Board on January 3, 1972, was not in the nature of a reconsideration but instead was a rescission of the previous action."

From this finding of fact, the District Judge concluded:

"The right of the majority to override protected minority rights has clear limitations in our constitutional democracy. See *Reitman* v. *Mulkey*, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); *Hunter* v. *Erickson*, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); also see *Alkire*

v. *Cashman*, — F.Supp. — (S.D. Ohio E.D. 1972). The rescission in early 1972 of the resolutions adopted by the 1971 School Board constituted an independent violation of the Equal Protection Clause rights enjoyed by the black minority of Dayton. See *Bradley* v. *Milliken*, 433 F.2d 897 (C.A. 6 1970); *Oliver* v. *Kalamazoo Board of Education*, 346 F.Supp. 766 (W.D. Mich. S.D. 1971), *aff'd.* 448 F.2d 635 (C.A. 6 1971)."

The passage of the three resolutions and their subsequent rescission by a Board of a different composition are factual matters about which there is no dispute. As hereinbefore stated, the record amply supports the District Judge's findings that racially imbalanced schools and optional attendance zones were elements of the cumulative violation of the appellants' constitutional rights. Accordingly, when the Dayton Board at its December 8, 1971, meeting passed resolutions designed, among other things, to eliminate racial imbalance and optional attendance zones in Dayton schools, it was acting in a manner consistent with its costitutional duties. Therefore, the rescission by a subsequent Board of these resolutions designed to carry out the Board's constitutional duties was an element of the cumulative violation of the appellants' constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

The question of whether a rescission of previous Board action is in and of itself a violation of appellants' constitutional rights is inextricably bound up with the question of whether the Board was under a constitutional duty to take the action which it initially took. Cf. *Hunter* v. *Erickson*, 393 U.S. 385 (1960); *Gomillion* v. *Lightfoot*, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). If the Board was not under such a duty, then the rescission of the initial action in and of itself cannot be a constitutional violation. If the Board was under such a duty, then the rescission becomes a part of the cumulative violation, and it is not necessary to ascertain whether the rescission *ipso facto* is an independent violation of the Constitution.

In view of our conclusion in this case that the rescission was a part of the cumulative violation of appellants' constitutional rights, we find it unnecessary to pass on the question of whether the rescission by itself was a violation of those rights.

We affirm the District Court's holding that racially imbalanced schools, optional attendance zones, and the Board's rescission of the three resolutions are cumulatively in violation of appellants' rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause.

IV. Other Alleged Constitutional Violations

On appeal, the appellants raise at least four other school practices which purportedly maintained and expanded the basically dual school system inherited at the time of *Brown*. These practices are in the areas of (A) staff assignment, (B) school construction, (C) grade structure and reorganization, and (D) transfers and transportation. The District Judge did not include any of these practices within his finding of cumulative violation of the appellants' constitutional rights.

(A) Staff Assignment

The record reveals that prior to the 1951-52 school year the Dayton Board basically assigned all black teachers only to schools with all black pupils and all white teachers to schools with predominantly white student bodies pursuant to an explicit segregation policy of the Board. In 1951-52, the Board introduced a new policy ostensibly to integrate the faculties, but which effectively continued in practice the racial assignment of faculty through the 1970-71 school year.

In a letter dated March 17, 1969, the Acting Director of the Office of Civil Rights of HEW notified the Dayton Board that "an analysis of the data obtained during the (compliance) review establishes that your district pursues a policy of racially motivated assignment of teachers and other professional staff."

Other relevant portions of this letter are contained in Section II of this opinion. Following receipt of the letter, the Dayton Board negotiated with HEW and agreed to desegregate its staff so "that each school staff throughout the district will have a racial composition that reflects the total staff of the district as a whole" in accordance with the principles of *United States* v. *Montgomery County Board of Education*, 395 U.S. 225 (1969). Thereafter, the Dayton Board realigned its school staffs for the 1970-71 school year.

The appellants admit that progress has been made with respect to eliminating segregative staff assignment, but allege that the agreement with HEW has not been fulfilled in that vestiges of the former practices persist which continue to identify schools as "black schools" or "white schools." As an example, at the high school level, the following table was presented by the appellants to demonstrate how Board assignment of its professional staff still served to identify schools as "black schools" or "white schools" in 1971-72 (w means white, b means black):

	Pupil % Black	*Faculty % Black*	*Principal*	*Coaches*
Belmont	5.2	23.1	w	10w, 2b
Wilbur Wright	9.2	28.5	w	10w, 3b
Kiser	9.8	20.1	w	10w, 2b
Meadowdale	10.6	23.5	w	13w, 3b
Stivers	14.0	32.4	w	10w, 4b
Fairview	24.1	29.8	w	10w, 5b
Col. White	54.6	32.0	w	9w, 6b
Roth	95.8	43.5	b	9w, 7b
Roosevelt	100.0	47.4	b	8w, 8b
Dunbar	100.0	50.3	b	7w, 9b

The witness Dr. Robert L. Green, Dean of the Urban College and Professor of Educational Psychology at Michigan State University, testified as follows:

"Q. Dr. Green, I believe I informed you that the faculties were desegregated as a result of HEW action in 1970.

"Do you have an opinion as to whether or not the effects of this history of faculty assignment persist in terms of identification of schools as black or white in the school district after the changing of the faculties as was done in this case?

"MR. GREER: Objection, your Honor.

"THE COURT: Overruled.

"A. Yes. The answer is yes, Mr. Lucas. When there has been historical practice of placing black teachers in schools specified as being essentially black schools and white teachers in schools that are identified or specified as being essentially white schools, even though faculty desegregation occurs, be it on a voluntary basis or under court order, the effect remains that school is yet perceived as being a black school or white school, especially if at this point in time the pupil composition of those schools are essentially uni-racial or predominantly black or predominantly white.

"Q. Dr. Green, you did examine the '68-'69 statistics for the Dayton School System, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And did you in examining the data note any correlation between the pupil composition of black or white and the faculty composition black or white?

"A. Yes, I did, Mr. Lucas.

"Q. Do you have an opinion whether this is isolated instances of correlation or is there any systematic pattern to it?

"A. There seems to be a systematic pattern as it relates to black teachers and the racial composition of schools vis-a-vis black youngsters and white youngsters being essentially placed in schools that are predominantly white."

The witness Dr. Foster testified as follows:

"Q. . . . In light of that history, could you give us your opinion as to the effect, first of all, of that policy before the change, in terms of identification of schools as black or white and the effects of that change on the present situation in the Dayton School System?

"MR. GREER: Objection.

"THE COURT: Overruled.

"A. Well, my opinion is that this policy and practice before the change we assume took place, especially since it is in a northern district, would indicate that the Board is missing or has missed a golden opportunity to prove that it does want to run a unitary system and remove segregation practices insofar as it is able, because the Board clearly, as I understand it, under most State laws, or all State laws, can assign teachers willy-nilly in the System wherever they want to. This is not a free choice matter.

"Q. Is it also an annual option that the school Board has?

"A. Yes, in terms of assignment. In terms of my opinion on what this does, as recently changed, assuming this, I would have to say that this does not remove by any means the vestages of a segregated system since it is only one component of several important aspects of a system segregated or desegregated. I think it is a very important component, and I think it is a step certainly in the direction of desegregation, and a very positive step.

"But coupled with the other most important step of pupil assignment, so long as the schools themselves remain segregated, as they certainly do at this time in my opinion in Dayton, then the fact that teachers or staff being desegregated, if we assume that doesn't carry near the weight it would if the total desegregation process had taken place."

Dr. Wayne M. Carle, Superintendent of Schools in Dayton at the time of the trial, testified as follows:

"BY MR. LUCAS:

"Q. Would you answer my preliminary question, then. Did you agree with the HEW conclusion that there was purposeful faculty and staff segregation in the Dayton School System?

"MR. GREER: We would object to this, your Honor, as it simply asks a self-serving conclusion of the witness.

"THE COURT: I am going to overrule your objection. You may answer.

"A. There is no question but what that was so.

BY MR. LUCAS:

"Q. Now, Doctor, I think you stated that there had been substantial faculty desegregation. Has there also been staff desegregation and, if you will, limit it to what you have defined as line personnel, principals, assistant principals?

"A. There has been considerable desegregation of administrative staff, but there still is a high correlation between the race of pupils and the race of the administrator.

* * *

"Now, today the percentage of black administrators is around 32 or 33 percent, as I recall. That indicates less discrimination in promotion, since there is more relationship between the percentage of teachers, which now is perhaps 34 or 35 percent, and administrators. But I am saying that with respect to their assignment, and particularly at the high school level, there is an almost perfect correlation between the race of the principal and the predominating race in the school. All four black high schools, for example, have black principals. All the other high schools have white principals. So that that considerable vestige of segregation still has not been eliminated. There would be other instances, if you just scan the statistics, in which previously all black or nearly black staff similarly have weighted errors in them, that

is, the error is still in the direction of the previous discrimination. If the staff previously were 70 percent and now should be, let's say, 30 percent black, it may still be 40 percent because of difficult factors in resolving it.

"In all cases, or probably in all cases, that error or that difference is still weighted to the previously fully segregated pattern, so that it is very difficult I think, to understand the depth of segregation. It is so pervasive that its vestiges are difficult. These are two areas in which that is very obvious."

(B) School Construction

The District Judge did not include the Dayton Board's school construction practices within the cumulative violation because he found the underlying motives behind such construction to be racially neutral, rendering the following as a finding of fact:

"(c) Site selection and construction

"(9) Since 1954 the school board of Dayton has constructed 14 new elementary schools and 69 elementary school additions. The construction follows the pattern of growth in the Dayton area and follows the specific policy of 'building schools where children are, or where they are expected to be.' New construction of elementary schools was largely on the periphery of the center city. There are instances of errors in Board planning in that some areas have not developed as expected and other developed areas have not become part of the Dayton School District, as expected. There are examples of schools operating substantially below capacity. While reasonable minds might reasonably differ on selection and construction of some schools, sufficient evidence has not been presented that school construction was segregative in nature other than to provide schools in white neighborhoods which remain predominately white and schools in black neighborhoods which remain predominately black.

"(10) Five new high schools and fourteen high school additions have been constructed in the past eighteen years. Construction of some high schools followed the pattern of construction of elementary schools in that sites selected were away from the center of the city and in neighborhoods which were predominately white. Other sites could have been selected near the center of the city in black neighborhoods. Such schools would arguably, at least, have had a larger proportion of whites attending such schools.

"Site selection is a matter of judgment and no evidence has been presented that the Board of Education failed to use neutral criteria in its choices. In the construction of schools, the Board, over the years, has been presented with options. Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of showing that the defendant Board exercised those options presented in an improper fashion."

On appeal, the appellants contend that there is substantial evidence in the record to support their claim that the Dayton Board's practices in school construction had a segregative effect and contributed substantially to the alleged present duality in pupil assignment. The record reveals that in the period of greatest expansion of the Dayton school system, from the late 1940's to the mid 1960's, the great majority of new schools and additions were located by the Board in either virtually all black or all white areas. Of 24 new schools constructed between 1950 and the present, 22 opened 90 per cent or more black or white. The following table contains some examples:

High Schools	*Date of Opening*	*% Black at Opening*	*% Black Pupils 1972-1973*
Patterson	1954	0.0	32.9
Belmont	1956	0.0	5.2
Meadowdale	1960	0.0	10.6
Dunbar	1962	92.3	100.0

Elementary Schools

Orville Wright	1952	0.0	8.1
Miami Chapel	1953	100.0	99.8
Horace Mann	1954	0.0	3.1
Bell Haven	1954	0.0	17.1
Hickorydale	1957	0.0	32.5
Meadowdale Elem.	1957	0.0	12.6
Louise Troy (Primary)	1957	100.0	99.1
Shoup Mill	1958	0.0	3.8
Carlson	1958	95.0	99.0
Jackson Primary	1960	99.9	99.7
McNary Park (Primary)	1964	100.0	100.0
Res. Park (Primary)	1966	96.5	100.0
Valerie	1966	0.0	24.0

On the issue of school construction practices, Dr. Foster testified as follows:

"Q. Dr. Foster, would you at this point tell me if you made an inquiry into the question which I think related to the construction issues of site selection?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And what was that inquiry?

"A. In terms of the use of site selections to maintain segregation, in the new construction sites from 1950 which we have already discussed to the present, many of these have helped to promote and to impact and lock in segregated or isolated situations either in the inner city or in the suburbs, and I think this is true in terms of both school segregation and housing segregation, that is, in terms of its effects. First of all, in the area of the white suburban expansions which are farthest from the center of the city which is all black, and these were, of course, more inaccessible at the time of construction than they are now. We have Valerie which was built in 1966 which is almost at the extreme north of the district. We have Meadowdale High School built in 1960 and Meadowdale Elementary built in 1957 to the north of

the district. We have Shoup Mill built in 1958 and to the nearly extreme north. The south and east of the furthest white suburban expansion, we have Eastmont, on the extreme east built in 1965. We have Wilbur Wright to the northeast built in 1952, Horace Mann to the southeast built in 1954, and Belmont High School in the southeast built in 1956.

"Now, contrary-wise, in the inner city during this time there were a couple of examples of schools which were built into locked-in situations in terms of segregation, and in fact these schools were surrounded by other schools which were all black. That would be McNary in 1964 and Jackson Primary in 1960.

"Q Dr. Foster, in your experience, use of the primary unit in close proximity to elementary schools, has this been a matter reflective of segregation practices in your experience?

"A Yes. It is in a sense very much nothing more than an addition. They are on the same campus and for all practical purposes they are really one school.

"Q. What effect does this have on the existing racial concentrations?

"A Well, it tends to secure it and to further insure that those schools are going to remain segregated and that the system as a whole is going to remain segregated."

Based on this evidence, the appellants dispute the District Court's conclusion that the Dayton Board's school construction practices were not a part of the cumulative violation. The appellants contend that on facts similar to those presented in this case the Supreme Court in *Swann, supra,* 402 U.S. at 20-21, found major constitutional violations on which a District Court could fashion a remedy.

(C) Grade Structure and Reorganization

The appellant's primary objection in this area is to the establishment of a middle school system in the 1971-72 school

year which allegedly had a segregative effect. Dr. Foster testified as follows:

> "My conclusion is that the establishment of the middle schools in 1971 resulted in the establishment of four out of five schools that were clearly racially identifiable, therefore, increasing or maintaining segregation as opposed to availing the opportunity of decreasing it."

Further, after the establishment of the new middle school structure, the Ohio State Department of Education gave the following advice to Dayton school authorities:

> "If what appears to be happening with middle schools is in fact happening, then Dayton has only added one more action to a long list of state-imposed activities which are offensive to the Constitution and which are degrading to schoolchildren. Along with many other affirmative duties which the Dayton Board must fulfill, correction of this particular offense must occur."

The District Court found that the boundaries established for the middle schools in September 1971 had "neither segregative nor integrative effect." The appellants submit that this finding means, under applicable legal standards, that the Board acted unconstitutionally to maintain segregation in the face of an opportunity to accomplish substantial desegregation. The appellants assert that the action of the Dayton Board was intentional because the Board was aware of desegregation alternatives but instead choose a plan whose predictable impact was not to further integrate the Dayton school system.

(D) Transfers and Transportation

Finally, the appellants contend that transfer and transportation practices of the Dayton Board, which might have held promise to accomplish further desegregation, have operated to maintain segregation and further earmark schools as "black"

or "white." In support of this contention, the appellants cite evidence that curriculum, hardship and disciplinary transfers have operated frequently to assign white children from "black schools" to "whiter schools" and black children from "white schools" to "blacker schools." Further, there is evidence in the record revealing that the Board assigned tuition pupils from outside the district on a dual basis; white pupils were assigned to white schools and black pupils were assigned to black schools.

The testimony of John Harewood, Assistant Superintendent of Dayton schools in charge of administration, reveals two instances in which children were bused "intact" with the effect of segregating children on a racial basis in separate classrooms within schools. In 1963, white children from Ruskin School were transported intact to separate classes in the mixed Central School. In the spring of 1968, some of the black children from Edison School, which had been partially destroyed by fire, were similarly segregated within a number of white schools throughout the city.

The District Court's only conclusion in the area of transfer and transportation practices was with regard to the school system's Freedom of Enrollment program. The District Court required that program be revised for Dayton high schools so that transfers for purpose of improving racial balance take precedence over curriculum transfers.

On the basis of the evidence adduced, the appellants' legal argument in this area is that the transfer and transportation practices of the Dayton Board had the "clear effect of earmarking schools according to their racial composition" which is proscribed by *Keyes* v. *School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,* 413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973).

(E) Conclusion as to Other Alleged Constitutional Violations

As hereinabove indicated in Section IV of this opinion, the appellants have raised serious questions with respect to wheth-

er the District Judge's failure to include these four school practices within the cumulative violation was supported by substantial evidence. In view of our holding in Section V hereof, we conclude that it is unnecessary at this stage to pass on whether the District Judge's findings of fact with respect to these four school practices is supported by substantial evidence.

V. Remedy

As more fully described in Section I hereof, the District Court ordered the Dayton Board of Education to submit a desegregation plan that conformed to all requirements of law. Subsequently, the four-member majority of the Dayton Board submitted an eleven point plan characterized by the appellants as a "free choice plan." Other plans were submitted to the District Court by the three-member minority of the Dayton Board and Dayton Classroom Teachers' Association. Without holding a hearing on the remedy issue, the District Court approved the plan of the Dayton Board majority with one modification.

The appellants' primary contention on appeal is that the desegregation plan approved by the District Court is inadequate to remedy the cumulative violation found by the District Court. We agree.

On receipt of the Board majority plan, the District Court was obliged "to assess the effectiveness of . . . [the] proposed plan in achieving desegregation . . . . in light of the circumstances present and the options available in each instance." *Green* v. *County School Board,* 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). The appellants assert that the circumstances present here, namely a cumulative violation, required a remedy of "all-out desegregation." *Keyes, supra,* 413 U.S. at 214. The appellants further assert that the plan of the Board minority would accomplish such "all-out desegregation" and that therefore we should remand this case to the District Court with instructions that it order the plan of the Board minority implemented.

Today we simply hold that the remedy ordered by the District Court is inadequate, considering the scope of the cumulative violations. The case is remanded to the District Court for proceedings to formulate a desegregation plan for the Dayton school system consistent with the remedial guidelines outlined in *Keyes, supra,* and *Swann, supra.* This holding does not necessarily require the District Court to implement the plan of the Board minority, but "all vestiges of state-imposed segregation," *Swann, supra,* 402 U.S. at 15, must be eliminated.

In formulating a desegregation plan, the District Court of course will adhere also to the guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court in *Milliken* v. *Bradley,* — U.S. — (No. 73-434, July 26, 1974), reversing *Bradley* v. *Milliken,* 484 F. 2d 215 (6th Cir. *in banc* 1973).

Once the plaintiffs-appellants have shown that state-imposed segregation existed at the time of *Brown* (or any point thereafter), school authorities "automatically assume an affirmative duty . . . to eliminate from the public schools within their school system 'all vestiges of state-imposed school segregation.'" *Keyes, supra,* 413 U.S. at 200. When such a showing has been made, "racially neutral" plans which fail to counteract the continuing effects of past school segregation are inadequate. *Id.* at 210-13.

VI. Other Directions on Remand

In its Supplemental Order on Remedy, dated July 13, 1973, the District Court suggested that its disposition of the case appeared "to require the dismissal of those non-Dayton defendants." We disagree with this suggestion as to the State defendants.

The District Court is directed to keep the State defendants as parties to this action. Although, according to the District Court order of procedure, evidence as to a state violation was supposed to be excluded from the initial trial, the follow-

ing evidence was adduced: The Dayton school district is chartered by the Ohio State Department of Education, and without such a charter, the district would be without power to operate and could not receive state aid. Ohio Revised Code, §§ 3301.16 and 3317.01. Since an Ohio Attorney General's opinion dated July 9, 1956, the State Department of Education has known that it has an affirmative duty under both Ohio and federal law to take all actions necessary, including, but not limited to, the withholding of state and federal funds, to prevent and eliminate racial segregation in the public schools. Finally, during the years in question in this case, the Dayton school district was denied any allocation of state funds for pupil transportation, although such funds were made available to most suburban and rural school districts in the state.

VII. Other Issues

Several other issues were presented which do not now require discussion. All contentions of the parties contrary to the conclusions reached in this opinion have been carefully considered and are found to be without merit.

VIII. Conclusion

The District Court's holding of a cumulative violation of the appellants' constitutional rights, as contained in its Findings of Fact and Memorandum Opinion of Law dated February 7, 1973, is affirmed.

Since we conclude that the remedy prescribed by the District Court is inadequate, the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to revise and supplement its order of July 13, 1973, entitled "Supplemental Order on Remedy," so as to formulate, in accordance with the guidelines hereinabove set forth, a desegregation plan for the Dayton school system and for other proceedings to that end not inconsistent with this opinion.

D. JANUARY 7, 1975 ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT RELATING TO SUBMISSION OF PLAN

(Filed January 7, 1975)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Civil No. 72-137

MARK BRINKMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN J. GILLIGAN, Governor
of the State of Ohio, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to remand by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and following informal conferences called by the Court limited to one attorney for the plaintiffs and one attorney for the defendants. The Court would be remiss if it did not recognize the contributions of plaintiffs' attorney, Louis Lucas, and defendants' attorney, David Greer, whose research, counsel and suggestions materially assisted the Court in the preliminary phase of this matter.

Based upon such conferences, the controlling decisions in this Circuit, and the state of the law on the subject as announced by the Supreme Court of the United States, the Court concludes that it is now appropriate to deal with

specific plans. The parties, including the plaintiffs, the defendant Board of Education of Dayton, and the Board of Education for the State of Ohio will confer and prepare plans either jointly or separately for submission to this Court which will accomplish the following ends and satisfy the requirements set forth in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 503 F.2d 684 (1974).

In the twenty years that have elapsed since *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), large numbers of American cities have faced the problem that now confronts Dayton and have adopted varying methods to solve it. Able, conscientious, and knowledgeable experts in this field have developed. Departments of government, both state and national, are anxious to assist. The experience of other cities and the available experts should be consulted by the parties in the ultimate solution of this problem. Such devices as "pairing" of schools, "clustering" of schools, alterations of attendance boundaries, "magnet" schools, feeder patterns, increasing school capacity, new construction and voluntary transfers, should all be considered. No known desegregation device should be overlooked. The proposals of the Board of Education, both those presented in response to this Court's Order of February, 1973, and those suggested in the informal discussions above referred to should not be abandoned. The thought and planning that preceded these proposals should not be ignored. These proposals have not been considered unresponsive; they have been considered insufficient. They do represent a base for further expansion.

The Court draws particular attention to the proposal of the Dayton School Board to construct magnet schools in the downtown area. It may well be that further development of this concept might achieve the desired goals as to high schools on a voluntary basis.

The Dayton freedom of enrollment program should not be abandoned. It, too, may contribute in great measure to a solution of the problem.

Deliberately absent from the foregoing suggestions is that of transporting students to accomplish racial balance. It does

not require much wisdom or foresight to recognize that this coercive solution is the least satisfactory. The Court will consider transportation of students only as a last resort and only after careful inquiry has established that no other solution exists.

One word of admonition: This is not a problem that will disappear by itself. It is concerned with basic constitutional rights that every public official, including this Court, is sworn to uphold.

In February of 1973, this Court observed that no peaceful community could long exist where two separate societies viewed each other from ever higher walls of suspicion and distrust. The tragic events of the past three months in the city of Boston, Massachusetts, have confirmed this observation with distrubing consequences.

With full respect for the Board's knowledge and ability; with full recognition of its representative responsibilities; and with full faith in its dedication and good will, the Court now requests the Board of Education to report upon the months of study and planning that have been completed as they relate to a solution of the problem herein.

The Board of Education will submit its plan to the Court on or before February 1, 1975. A completed plan will be made available for public inspection on or before January 20, 1975. Should it appear necessary, hearings on such plan and any other submitted by interested parties will be held on or before February 15, 1975.

It is so ORDERED.

/s/ CARL B. RUBIN
United States District Judge

E. MARCH 10, 1975 ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT ADOPTING PLAN OF DAYTON BOARD OF EDUCATION

(Filed March 10, 1975)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

Civil No. 72-137

MARK BRINKMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOHN J. GILLIGAN, Governor
of the State of Ohio, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to remand by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In accordance therewith this Court on January 7, 1975, directed the School Board of the City of Dayton to submit a plan of desegregation by February 1, 1975 consistent with such Order of Remand. Subsequently, plaintiffs also filed a plan and a hearing on both was held February 17, 19, and 20, 1975.

I. Basis of Court's Consideration

In order to place this Court's consideration of any remedial plan in a proper context certain introductory observations should be made:

1. All desegregation efforts must be tested initially against the principle that separate facilities limited to blacks and whites are forbidden;[1]

2. Racial balance, i.e., a reflection of the district percentages in each school is not a Constitutional right equivalent to the principle above enunciated;[2]

3. It is not the function of district courts to operate public school systems, to determine social values, or to engage in restructuring of communities, personal attitudes, or sociological benefits, except as these matters may bear upon Constitutional rights.[3]

To the foregoing the court would add the following which

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[1] "In the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal"; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).

[2] Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. at page 24:

"If we were to read the holding of the District Judge to require as a matter of substantive Constitutional rights any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged to reverse. The Constitutional command to desegregate schools does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole."

See also: Milliken v. Bradley, —— U.S. —— (1974), 94 S.Ct. 3112 at p. 3125.

"The failure of an educational agency to attain a balance on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin of students among its schools shall not constitute a denial of equal educational opportunity or equal protection of the laws." 20 U.S.C. § 1704.

[3] "School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a Constitutional violation, however, that would not be within the authority of a federal court." Swann v. Board of Education, supra.

may be deemed findings of fact whether implicit in or explicated by previous opinions of this Court.

1. The State of Ohio does not now, nor has it since 1887 mandated a dual system of public education. To the contrary, 84 Ohio Law 34, dated February 22, 1887, specifically required a unitary public school system.

2. The defendant School Board of the City of Dayton had engaged in activities which were segregative in effect and which did impinge upon the Constitutional rights of students in such system. At no time, however, did defendant maintain a dual system of education.

3. Overt evidences of such segregative activities have been eliminated both by action of the Board of Education and by previous Order of this Court but the effect thereof may not.

II. Duty of District Courts

With the determination that acts of segregation did occur it is now necessary to examine the duty imposed upon this Court under such circumstances. While there is a variation in the description of such duty, this Court elects to be guided in this matter by the following: "In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294.

There is, however, a final admonition in *Swann* that bears careful attention: "As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." *Swann* v. *Board of Education, supra* at p. 16.[4]

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[4] A subsequent determination by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) holds there is broad discretionary power granted to trial courts in shaping equity decrees. Lemon, it should be pointed out, is not a school desegregation case.

Two events that bear upon the scope of appropriate remedy have occurred since August 20, 1974, the date of the appellate holding in this case. These events may well have changed both "the nature of the violation" and the "scope of the remedy." They require further discussion.

First: Effective October 20, 1974, the Congress of the United States adopted the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1701 *et seq.*[5]

Section 1701 declares it to be the policy of the United States that:

"1. All children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and

2. The neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school assignment."

Section 1712 imposes a limitation upon courts in the following language: "In formulating a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity or a denial of equal protection of the laws, a court . . . shall seek or impose only such remedies as are essential to correct *particular denials of equal educational opportunity or equal protection of the laws.* [Emphasis added]

In § 1713 is listed a priority of remedies and in § 1714 there is a specific limitation which holds: "No court. . . shall pursuant to § 1713 of this Title order the implementation of a plan that would require the transportation of any student to a school other than the school closest or next closest to his place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education for such students."

Second: On December 6, 1974, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided *George and Carolyn Higgins* v. *Board of Education of the City of Grand Rapids*, (No. 73-2189), — F.2d — (1974). The Court in *Higgins*

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[5] The effective date of the above act is said to be, "On and after the sixtieth day after August 21, 1974."

followed *Deal* v. *City of Cincinnati Board of Education*, 369 F.2d 55, *cert. denied* 389 U.S. 847, in these words: "*Deal* [upheld] the constitutionality of retaining neighborhood schools where racial imbalance has not been caused by any discrimination on the part of school officials."[6]

If the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy, it becomes critical to determine whether or not there is an unremedied district-wide segregative act. This Court found in its Order of July 13, that specific segregative acts, since eliminated; the existence of optional attendance zones, now eliminated; and conditions of racially imbalanced schools together required action by the federal courts.

We do not deal with a mandated dual school system; we do not deal with actions taken on a school-by-school basis.[7] We do deal with a system that has in the past permitted segregative practices to exist. The issue, therefore, is whether a plan intended to improve the educational opportunities for all students without a school-by-school restructuring basis is appropriate. This Court holds at this time that it is.

III. Plaintiffs' Plan

The plaintiffs have urged upon this Court a plan which will assign students among the Dayton schools in a black/white

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[6] Higgins mentions Brinkman v. Gilligan on page 19. This Court respectfully suggests that the following sentence contained therein: "These three findings were held in their cumulative effect to be enough to reflect *de jure* segregation.", requires for full significance an examination of the specific holding of the court. See footnote 7 *infra*.

[7] The only district-wide action of the defendants involved the rescission of resolutions in January of 1970. The United States Court of Appeals dealt with the issue as follows:

"We hold that the findings of fact upon which the District Court based its conclusion of accumulative violations are not clearly erroneous but to the contrary are amply supported by the evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52A. However, we do not pass upon the question at the present time as to whether the rescission of the Board resolutions in and of itself constituted an independent violation of the Constitution. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684 at 693.

ratio approximating the district-wide ratio for such schools with a variation of 15%, plus or minus, from the mean.[8] To accomplish this, the plantiffs would create "clusters" of elementary schools, additional middle schools, and redistricted high schools. The term "cluster" is taken to mean a group of schools, usually more than two, within a common attendance district to which students will be sent irrespective of proximity to their place of residence.[9] Plaintiffs' plan is a comprehensive one; it was carefully prepared and well-presented. It will do what the plaintiffs urge must be done. It is not intended to, nor will it, in and of itself, provide alternate educational programs or seek innovative learning experiences. In the plaintiffs' view, these are obligations of any school board irrespective of the integration or segregation of the schools. Since this question is not before the Court, it will not be ruled upon.

In the Order of Remand by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the following appears:

"In formulating a desegregation plan, the District Court, of course, will adhere also to the guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court in *Milliken* v. *Bradley*, — U.S. —, 94 S.Ct. 3112 (1974)."

The majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger includes the following: "Viewing the record as a whole, it seems clear that the District Court and the Court of Appeals shifted the primary focus from a Detroit remedy to the metropolitan area only because of their conclusion that total desegregation of Detroit would not produce the racial balance which they perceived as desirable. Both courts proceeded on an assumption that the Detroit schools could not be truly desegregated – in their view of what constituted desegregation – unless the racial composi-

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[8] According to the testimony the appropriate percentages of Black students for the year 1974 - 1975 are:

Elementary Schools	44.2%
Middle Schools	68.7%
High Schools	45.5%

[9] Portions of the record dealing with this transportation are included herein as Appendix A.

tion of the student body of each school substantially reflected the racial composition of the popu'ation of the metropolitan area as a whole. . .. In *Swann* which arose in the context of a single independent school district the Court held, 'If we were to read the holding of the District Court to require as a matter of substantive Constitutional rights any particular degree of racial balance or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged to reverse; 402 U.S. at 24.

The clear import of this language from *Swann* is that desegregation in the sense of dismanteling a dual school system does not require any particular racial balance in 'each school, grade or classroom.' " 94 S.Ct. at 3125.

It would seem, therefore, that whether the area in question is a single school district as in *Swann* or in multi-school districts as in *Milliken*, the obligation does not exist to create racial balance which is in essence the sole function of the plaintiffs' plan.

Accordingly, this Court holds that a comprehensive plan, such as plaintiffs suggest, is not required at this time. We hold also that plaintiffs' plan as presented is violative of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1701, *et seq.*, and particularly §§ 1713 and 1714.

IV. The Defendant's Plan

The defendant's plan was presented to the Court in a 17 page memorandum with a 26 page exhibit of tables and statistics and a 69 page appendix. It also contains much extraneous material. Only the "magnet" program and the "learning centers" concept require comment.

A magnet high school[10] with programs not offered at home high schools and "satellite" magnet programs intended to attract students from their high schools and districts of residence

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[10] The term "magnet high school" is deemed to mean a school open to all students with programs sufficiently attractive that students will elect to attend. The Stivers-Patterson vocational complex is one example of a magnet school.

is proposed. If successful, the magnet program will provide an opportunity to students, both black and white, to obtain additional educational advantages equally attractive to both. Magnet schools are an acceptable desegregation device. 20 U.S.C. § 1713(f).

The magnet schools are supplemented by "learning centers" for foreign languages and business education for 6th, 7th, and 8th grades; career motivation for 4th and 5th grades; science for 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th grades; and a science environmental center for the 6th grade.

Learning centers to which students are transported are integrative in concept. Plaintiffs assert that such transportation is also violative of 20 U.S.C. §§ 1713 and 1714 since it would require bussing of students to schools other than the school closest or next closest to his or her place of residence. We leave this argument for another day and another court. We hold only that the plan comports with the Congressional declaration of policy set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1701.

The overall plan is desegrative in intent; it is not violative of *Brown* v. *Board of Education, supra,* and it does not appear to violate the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit so long as the following limitations are observed:

1. All programs including the magnet schools and the learning centers must be so located that the burden of transportation is substantially equal upon both black and white students;
2. The composition of all classes must be no less than the mean for the appropriate schools plus or minus 15%;[11]
3. The faculty assigned to all programs must reflect the racial percentages of faculty within the system as a whole;
4. The amount of time of student assignment to classes in learning centers shall not be less than 20% of such student's total instructional time.

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[11] See Footnote 9.

It is entirely possible that the proposed program will not attract an appropriate number of black and white students and might instead further segregate the Dayton school system. Because it is innovative, because it offers the opportunity for alternative quality education, and because it has been proposed by a board of popularly elected officials, the Plan should be given a fair trial. The Board's plan will be accepted provisionally for the school year 1975 — 1976. The provisional acceptance requires this Court once more to continue jurisdiction of this matter.

There is an omission in the comprehensive plan submitted by the defendants. It is not possible to determine whether the numerous desegregative techniques set forth in this Court's Order of January 7, 1975, have been fully investigated. It is not known, for example, whether adjustments of existing school attendance zones would reduce concentrations of black and white attendance. It is not known whether feasible pairing or clustering of schools could be accomplished without bussing violative of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act.

Accordingly, the defendants are directed to conduct such a study and to report to this Court on or before October 1, 1975, of the results thereof on a school-by-school basis. Further hearings will thereupon be held and an alternative plan consistent with the Equal Educational Opportunities Act will be established on or before January 1, 1976.

In the event defendants are unable by the methods approved in July of 1973 and those approved by this Order to accomplish what this Court deems to be adequate progress in complying with the Equal Educational Opportunities Act and the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, such alternative plan will become effective for the school year beginning in September, 1976, and for all school years thereafter.

V. The Dayton School Board

The willingness of this Court to accept defendant's plan at this time is dictated in part by the attitude of the School Board

in the City of Dayton. This Court has not been faced with the problems of Judge James B. McMillan who dealt with a recalcitrant school board in *Swann* v. *Charlotte Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra,* nor with those of Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr., who has dealt with a contumacious school board in Boston. Any reasonable plan submitted by a board which has demonstrated good faith is entitled in the first instance to careful consideration by a court and in cases of doubt to have such doubt resolved in its favor. Good faith is a two-way street.

VI. Progress of the Case

The pace at which desegregation cases proceed through the courts has been a source of concern by courts and a source of frustration for litigants.[12] It has frequently been observed that over 21 years has elapsed since *Brown* v. *Board of Education, supra,* and the problem appears far from solved. It can even be asserted that the magnitude of the problem has in fact increased in that time. To postpone yet again the ultimate determination of this matter may appear to the plaintiffs to be a further delay of their rights. A chronology of the significant dates in this proceeding might held to place the matter in is proper context.

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[12] The complexities of school desegregation have resulted in the following instances of prolonged litigation:

a. Goss v. Board of Education of the City of Knoxville, Tennesse, original District Court opinion, 186 F.Supp. 559 (1960), recent opinion of United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 444 F.2d 632 (1971);

b. Kelly v. Board of Education of the City of Nashville (subsequently Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville), original District Court opinion, 139 F.Supp. 578 (1956), recent opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 463 F.2d 732 (1972).

c. "These appeals represent another installment of an already lengthy serial: 'The desegregation of the Memphis Public School System'. The initial chapter of this story was written in 1960. . ." Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 466 F.2d 890 (1972).

This case was filed in May of 1972. It was heard on the merits in November of 1972.

A Findings of Fact and Memorandum Opinion of Law was filed in February of 1973. An Order imposing integrative remedies upon defendants was filed in July of 1973. During the school year 1973 – 1974 and 1974 – 1975 these remedies were in effect.

The Order of Remand by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit became effective in October of 1974. The Order herein will at the minimum be effective for the school year 1975 – 1976.

While this is hardly a model of speed and dispatch, it is consistent with the magnitude of the problem that must be solved.

In the mass of rhetoric, emotional outbursts, and demogoguery that have attended the progression of many school desegregation cases, a few voices have been heard to suggest a rule of moderation. One such by Senior Judge Clifford O'Sullivan of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit bears repetition:

> "The hope or dream that one day we will have become a people without any motivation borne of our differing racial beginnings will have a better chance of fulfillment if patience accompanies our endeavors. Strident and truculent judicial commands could indeed exacerbate what now remains of racial bias and prejudice."
> *Goss* v. *Board of Education of the City of Knoxville, Tennessee,* 444 F.2d 632 at 640.

VII. Conclusion

In view of the foregoing, the Court holds as follows:

1. The plan of the defendants as modified herein will have an integrative effect upon the Dayton school system and is provisionally adopted for the school year 1975 – 1976.

2. The plan of the plaintiffs is violative of The Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq., and

imposes a burden upon the defendant school board beyond that which it is presently required to bear.

3. The state of the law in desegregation cases, the Order of Remand in this case, and the Congressional intent in the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, supra, do not require the adoption of a mathematical ratio plan wherein each school, grade or classroom of the district shall contain any particular balance of black and white students representative of the district as a whole.

4. Where the previous actions of a school board indicate only a difference of opinion on a subject concerning which reasonable minds may reasonably differ, bad faith will not be presumed and a proposal, although novel and untried, will be given an opportunity for success.

5. In view of developments, subsequent to August 20, 1974, the Court is of the opinion that holdings herein regarding the Equal Educational Opportunities Act involve a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal from this Order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Accordingly, the Court does so certify in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(4)(b). An application for appeal in accordance with this determination shall not stay the proceedings in this Court.

It is so ORDERED.

/s/ CARL B. RUBIN
United States District Judge

APPENDIX A TO MARCH 10, 1975 ORDER

. . . after this matter was raised during the Louisville argument in the Sixth Circuit, and the Court's inquiry was whether or not the Act of Congress could overcome the constitutional provisions which were being enforced by the courts, and I think I had related that to the witness. I am not sure, but I was present when the Sixth Circuit asked that question, and that conformed with my earlier reading of the Broomfield Amendments which had a similar purpose but, however, had the same saving clause about the power of the courts is not impaired where necessary to remedy a constitution violation.

THE COURT: Well, we are not going to debate the constitutionality of an Act of Congress. I am concerned with the presentation of a plan where it is somewhat peripheral as to the consideration of this Act.

Mr. Greer, you may continue.

CONTINUATION OF CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. GREER:

Q. Yesterday, Doctor Foster, we discussed the schools that were left unaffected by your pairing and clustering at the elementary level, and the two examples of the contiguous pairing in your plan. Let's move on to the other nine clusters that comprise your elementary school plan. Each of those nine clusters involve a substantial amount of required bussing of school children to schools beyond those that are closest or next closest to their place of residence; isn't that correct?

A. I believe that is correct, yes.

Q. Let's look, for example, at cluster F of your group. A child in the Lewton school district which is in the eastern part of Dayton is required to spend grades 4 and 5 in Edison school which is on the west side of Dayton; is that not right?

A. That's right.

Q. And am I not also correct that the following schools are closer to the Lewton district: Eastmont, Grant which you are converting to a middle school –

A. Would you hold that just a minute so I can make a note of those?

Q. Sure.

A. All right. Between Lewton and Edison you are speaking of?

Q. That's correct.

A. And what are the schools again?

Q. Well, let me just list them off. It would be Eastmont, Kemp, Washington which in your original plan you were going to close, Franklin, Cleveland, Belmont, Horace Mann and then another school that you are planning to turn into a middle school which is Ruskin, Huffman, Webster, Emerson, Patterson, McGuffey, Hawthorne which is your original plan was going to be closed, Irving and Whittier.

A. Well, if you are talking about a direct line between the two schools, you couldn't possibly get all those schools in between the two you are speaking of.

Q. My question wasn't phrased in terms of the way the crow flies. It is whatever schools are closer to the residence of a child living in the Lewton district, and all of those schools would be closer to that child's residence; isn't that true?

A. You mean as the crow flies?

Q. Let's get a lame crow and say going in any direction. Let's make an arc just so we know the distance of what is closer to a child living in the Lewton district.

A. It would say it generally might be true, but to say it was true, I would want to go to the map.

THE COURT: Why don't you do that, Doctor.

THE WITNESS: How many schools did you name altogether?

BY MR. GREER:

Q. Eighteen different schools.

A. All right.

Q. And the same type of situation, of course, would be true in that cluster with respect to students living in the Edison district who would be going over to the east end of Dayton in grades 1 through 3; isn't that true?

A. Yes.

Q. If we turn to cluster C, a child in the first or second grade at Eastmont would be required to be bussed beyond some seventeen or eighteen closer schools in order to attend classes at Highview; isn't that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And vice versa the same kind of situation would be true for a child living in the Highview district during grades 3 to 5?

A. Yes.

Q. If we look on cluster I, the required bussing between Gardendale and Shiloh passes by ten school zones which are closer to the residences of the children in those two affected school districts; isn't that right?

A. Without counting them, I would believe that is probably accurate, yes.

Q. And without going through the tedium of each of these clusters, isn't it true that the same kind of cross-town required bussing affects students in 24 out of the 28 school zones that are paired or grouped in clusters under your proposal?

A. Again without counting, I would believe that would probably be accurate, yes.

Q. And you have before you the statistics, of course, as to the number of children enrolled in these various schools, don't you?

A. Yes.

Q. Am I not correct in each year something in the area of 9,000 students under your plan would be bussed beyond the second closest school to their place of residence?

A. Pardon me just a second.

Well, I don't get quite that many. At a quick count, I get something like 7,000.

Q. Does that comprise all of the students in these 24 out of 28 school zones?

A. It would comprise the students in the clusters that you referred to, and our count should be the same because my counts were the same as your staff person that testified about students being bussed in the clusters.

Q. Right. What you just computed for me has been the nine out of the eleven clusters that we started talking about today?

A. That's correct.

F. JUNE 24, 1975 OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS

(Filed June 24, 1975)

No. 75-1410
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MARK BRINKMAN, ET AL., *Plaintiffs-Appellants,* v. JOHN J. GILLIGAN, ET AL., *Defendants-Appellees.*	APPEAL from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and PECK and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge. For a second time this court is called upon to review the constitutionality of a plan ordered by the District Court for the school system of Dayton, Ohio, to remedy cumulative constitutional violations found to exist in that school system. Reference is made to the previous decision of this court, reported at 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974), for a detailed recitation of facts and issues.

By a statute enacted February 22, 1887, the State of Ohio abolished separate schools for white and Negro children. Nevertheless, the District Court found that the Dayton school system has failed in many particulars to meet the standards of Ohio law mandating an integrated school system and to comply with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Segregative acts and practices were found to have occurred both before and after the decision of the Supreme

Court in *Brown* v. *Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and to have continued down to the present time. These findings of fact as to segregative practices in Dayton are set forth in detail in our former opinion and will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that in our former opinion this court ruled that the findings of fact of the District Court as to unconstitutional practices on the part of Dayton School officials are not clearly erroneous, but to the contrary are supported by substantial evidence.

Although the phrase "de jure" does not appear in our former opinion, the meaning of that decision is that the Dayton school system has been and is guilty of de jure segregation practices. *See Keyes* v. *School District No. 1*, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).

We agreed with the District Court as to his findings of fact in our former opinion, but held the remedy ordered by that court to be inadequate, considering the scope of the constitutional violations. We remanded the case to the District Court with directions to formulate a desegregation plan for the Dayton school system consistent with the remedial guidelines outlined in *Keyes, supra*, and in *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

In our former opinion we said:

> Once the plaintiffs-appellants have shown that state-imposed segregation existed at the time of *Brown* (or any point thereafter), school authorities "automatically assume an affirmative duty . . . to eliminate from the public schools within their school system 'all vestiges of state-imposed school segregation.'" *Keyes, supra*, 413 U.S. at 200, 93 S.Ct. at 2693. When such a showing has been made, "racially neutral" plans which fail to counteract the continuing effects of past school segregation are inadequate. *Id.* at 210-213, 93 S.Ct. 2686. 503 F.2d at 704.

On remand the District Court required the plaintiffs and the Board of Education to submit plans. The plaintiffs' plan

was rejected. The Board's plan was adopted for the school year 1975-76 with minor modifications.

The present appeal is from the decision of the District Court implementing the Board's plan. The question on appeal is whether the Board's plan conforms to the mandate of this court in our decision reported at 503 F.2d 684. We hold that it does not.

The plan approved by the District Court contains some provisions which apparently might effect some improvements in the segregated conditions found to exist in this school system. Some of its key features are as follows:

1. The closing of Roosevelt High School, with its 100 per cent black enrollment. The students previously enrolled at Roosevelt High would be permitted to attend any high school of their choice.

2. Creation of a downtown magnet high school at the Central YMCA, with programs not offered at home high schools, to serve a maximum of 300 students at any one time, and satellite magnet programs intended to attract students from their high schools and districts of residence, which could serve not more than 375 students at any one time. The District Court said: "If successful, the magnet program will provide an opportunity to students, both black and white, to obtain additional educational advantages equally attractive to both." The students would remain in their assigned schools for all other instruction.

3. Creation of three magnet learning centers at which elementary students could participate in foreign language, career motivation, and business education programs. The three centers together would serve about 880 students, who would remain in their assigned schools for other instruction.

4. Expansion of science centers to accommodate additional elementary students. The centers would have a racially balanced enrollment, and attendance would be mandatory, but only ten percent of the student's total instruction time would be spent at the centers.

5. A new vocational school for high school students, known as Kiser Career Center, would be established. This school would have a balanced racial composition, serving 210 students on a free-choice basis.

6. Restructuring of Miami Chapel elementary school into an alternative elementary school with enrollment optional and on a full-time basis. Miami Chapel has a capacity of over 700 students, but the Board anticipates that the school as restructured will serve approximately 500 students. Miami Chapel presently is an all-black school serving 380 students, and there is some indication in the record that these students, if not admitted to the restructured school, will be assigned to the all-black Louise Troy or Wogaman schools.

7. Creation of a magnet alternative school for 150 intermediate grade level students in an attempt to keep potential drop-outs in school, without regard to race.

8. The freedom of enrollment and open enrollment programs put into effect earlier by the Board would be continued.

In approving this plan, the District Court added the following provisions:

1. All programs including the magnet schools and the learning centers must be so located that the burden of transportation is substantially equal upon both black and white students;
2. The composition of all classes must be no less than the mean for the appropriate schools plus or minus 15%;
3. The faculty assigned to all programs must reflect the racial percentages of faculty within the system as a whole;
4. The amount of time of student assignment to classes in learning centers shall not be less than 20% of such student's total instructional time.

This is essentially all the relief afforded by the District Court

for the 1975-76 school year. The court expressed uncertainty as to whether the plan would be completely effective and ordered the Board to develop and file a more comprehensive plan by January 1, 1976. The court stated that if the 1975-76 plan should prove to be ineffective, an alternate plan would be instituted for the school year beginning in September 1976.

The District Court described the approved plan as "desegregative in intent" and concluded that it would have "an integrative effect." It appears that the plan contains some significant curricular innovations and that it would be a step toward integration of the Dayton school system. We believe, however, that more is required by the Constitution, by recent decisions of the Supreme Court, including those herein cited, and by the previous mandate of this court. As the appellants point out, under the plan approved by the District Court the basic pattern of one-race schools will continue largely unabated. The plan does not even purport to dismantle Dayton's one-race schools other than Miami Chapel and Roosevelt High School, and even if the magnet plans are successful, the vast majority of one-race schools will remain identifiable as such. The District Court's plan fails to eliminate the continuing effects of past segregation and is, therefore, inadequate.

In the course of his opinion, the District Judge noted two events which have occurred since our first opinion in this case, both of which he thought supported the narrow remedy he ordered on remand.

The District Court said:

> First: Effective October 20, 1974, the Congress of the United States adopted the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1701 *et seq.*
>
> Section 1701 declares it to be the policy of the United States that:
>
> "1. All children enrolled in public schools are entitled

to equal educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and

2. The neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school assignment."

Section 1712 imposes a limitation upon courts in the following language: "In formulating a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity or a denial of equal protection of the laws, a court . . . shall seek or impose only such remedies as are essential to correct *particular denials of equal educational opportunity or equal protection of the laws.* [Emphasis added]

In § 1713 is listed a priority of remedies and in § 1714 there is a specific limitation which holds: "No court . . . shall pursuant to § 1713 of this Title order the implementation of a plan that would require the transportation of any student to a school other than the school closest or next closest to his place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and type of education for such students."

Second: On December 6, 1974, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided *George and Carolyn Higgins* v. *Board of Education of the City of Grand Rapids,* (No. 73-2189), 508 F.2d 779 (1974). The Court in *Higgins* followed *Deal* v. *City of Cincinnati Board of Education,* 369 F.2d 55, *cert. denied* 389 U.S. 847, in these words: "*Deal* [upheld] the constitutionality of retaining neighborhood schools where racial imbalance has not been caused by any discrimination on the part of school officials."[6]

---

[6] Higgins mentions Brinkman v. Gilligan on page 19. This Court respectfully suggests that the following sentence contained therein: "These three findings were held in their cumulative effect to be enough to reflect *de jure* segregation.", requires for full significance an examination of the specific holding of the court.

The Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974 by its terms does not prevent the District Court from carrying into effect

the previous mandate of this court. 20 U.S.C. § 1702(b) expressly provides:

> (b) For the foregoing reasons, it is necessary and proper that the Congress, pursuant to the powers granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, specify appropriate remedies for the elimination of the vestiges of dual school systems, *except that the provisions of this chapter are not intended to modify or diminish the authority of the courts of the United States to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States.* (Emphasis supplied.)

We construe the 1974 Act, read as a whole, as not limiting either the nature or the scope of the remedy for constitutional violations in the instant case.

There could be no possible merit in the contention that the opinion of this court in *Higgins*, relating to the school system of Grand Rapids, Michigan, altered in any way the nature of the cumulative violations described in our former opinion in the present case or the scope of the constitutional remedy required by this court on the remand which we directed in that opinion. The law in the present case is embodied in the opinion of this court reported at 503 F.2d 684. Our previous opinion is not changed in any way by *Higgins*, which dealt with a different school system and a distinguishable factual situation.

Appellants have petitioned for summary reversal. Except for the time factor, we would be inclined to grant this relief. However, it obviously would be difficult if not impossible, in the limited time now available, for the District Court to formulate a comprehensive plan for the 1975-76 school term and to put it into effect in September 1975 without disruption of the large school system in the Dayton school district.

Instead of summary reversal, we remand this case to the District Court with directions to modify the plan previously approved for the 1975-76 school year so as to improve the racial

balance before September 1, 1975, in as many of the remaining racially identifiable schools in the Dayton system as feasible.

We further direct that black students who attended the Miami Chapel elementary school during the 1974-75 school year, and who are not assigned to the restructured Miami Chapel school, be assigned to other than all-black schools during the 1975-76 school year.

The District Court already has expressed an intention to adopt a revised and improved plan for the school year 1976-77. On remand we direct that the court adopt a system-wide plan for the 1976-77 school year that will conform to the previous mandate of this court and to the decisions of the Supreme Court in *Keyes* and *Swann*. We direct that this plan be adopted not later than December 31, 1975, so that it may be placed in effect at the beginning of the new school year in September 1976.

This case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The mandate of this court on the present appeal will issue forthwith. The costs of this appeal are taxed against the Dayton Board of Education.

G. JUNE 24, 1975 REMAND JUDGMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS

(Filed June 24, 1975)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 75-1410

MARK BRINKMAN, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

JOHN J. GILLIGAN, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and PECK and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

APPEAL from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause be and the same is hereby remanded for further proceedings.

It is further ordered that Plaintiffs-Appellants recover from

the Dayton Board of Education the costs on appeal, as itemized below, and that execution therefore issue out of said District Court if necessary.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

John P. Hehman, Clerk

By /s/GRACE KELLER
Grace Keller
Chief Deputy

Issued as Mandate: June 24, 1975

COSTS: Amount to be determined later

Filing fee ----------$

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John P. Hehman, Clerk

By /s/GRACE KELLER
Chief Deputy

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-403

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
OCT 9 1975
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

DAYTON BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

MARK BRINKMAN, ET AL.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-403

DAYTON BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

MARK BRINKMAN, ET AL.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court for further consideration (Pet. App. 89a-96a) is reported at 518 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1975). The District Court's order (Pet. App. 73a-88a) is not reported. Prior opinions and orders of the District Court (Pet. App. 1a-31a) are unreported. The Court of Appeals' prior opinion affirming but remanding with directions (Pet. App. 32a-69a) is reported at 503 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1974).

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals' judgment remanding the case to the District Court (Pet. App. 97a-98a) was rendered on

June 24, 1975. This Court's certiorari jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether any issue warranting this Court's review is presented by the Court of Appeals' remand of this school desegregation case with directions that the District Court reconsider the remedy in the light of *Keyes v. School District No. 1,* 413 U.S. 189 (1973) and *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,* 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and the Court of Appeals' previous mandate.

STATEMENT

This is a school desegregation action against city and state officials having responsibility for the maintenance and operation of the public schools of Dayton, Ohio. The action was commenced in April 1972. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court in February 1973 found a constitutional violation (Pet. App. 12a)—on the basis of its findings that there was substantial segregation in the racial composition of Dayton schools; that defendants had utilized optional or dual attendance zones; and that other board action, both historic and recent, also contributed to the segregation.[1] The District Court held "that the totality of these findings require intervention by this Court under the mandate of *Brown v. Board of Education*" (Pet. App. 12a). Accordingly, the District Court directed the school board to prepare a plan for desegregation (Pet. App. 13a, 34a).

---

[1]E.g., the illegal rescission, during the 1971-72 school year, of a system-wide program of desegregation (Pet. App. 10a-11a); explicit "physical segregation" of teachers, pupils, facilities and programs among and within schools pre-*Brown* (Pet. App. 2a-3a); intentional creation and maintenance of the Dunbar High School as a city-wide, all-black school (Pet. App. 4a-5a).

Separate plans were submitted to the Court by a majority of the membership of the Dayton Board of Education and by a minority thereof. The plan presented by the board majority proposed to eliminate dual zones, to revise priorities for permitting free choice transfers, and to provide certain part-time integration in specialized programs such as science, vocational training, music, and athletics (Pet. App. 35a-36a). The board minority submitted its own more comprehensive plan in the belief that the plan of the board majority would maintain the status quo (Pet. App. 36a). In July 1973 the District Court, while expressing disappointment at the limited nature of the board majority's proposal (Pet. App. 27a), essentially accepted that plan with the proviso that the board adopt a freedom-of-choice method of assigning students to high schools. Plaintiffs (here the Respondents) appealed; and the defendants (here the Petitioners) cross-appealed.

On August 20, 1974, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's ultimate finding that the Dayton schools were unlawfully segregated by race (Pet. App. 56a). In addition to the evidence specified by the District Court as part of violation (Pet. App. 39a-56a), the Court of Appeals also reviewed defendants' other discriminatory practices promoting and perpetuating racial segregation in the assignment of faculty and staff (Pet. App. 56a-61a), in the location and construction of new schools (Pet. App. 61a-64a), in the reorganization of grade structures (Pet. App. 64a-65a), and in student transfers and transportation (Pet. App. 65a-66a).[2] The Court of Appeals

---

[2]For example, the Court of Appeals noted that prior to 1951 faculty and staff were assigned on a racial basis "pursuant to an

[footnote continued]

concluded that "the remedy ordered by the District Court is inadequate, considering the scope of the cumulative violations" (Pet. App. 68a) and remanded the case for further remedial steps consistent with *Swann*, *Keyes* and *Milliken (Id.)*. Certiorari was not sought.

Following remand of the case, the board majority and the plaintiffs each presented separate plans to the District Court. The board majority plan (see Pet. App. 91a-92a) is, frankly, difficult to describe. It is, however, essentially a limited expansion of the prior plan—a modified freedom of choice plan calling for the establishment in some schools of programs not offered in others. These special program schools would be called "magnet schools" and "learning centers." The programs offered were to be designed to attract a limited bi-racial enrollment on a voluntary and, in the main, part-time basis (see Pet. App. 91a-92a). In contrast, the plaintiffs' plan used traditional techniques of rezoning, pairing, and grouping of schools. On March 10, 1975, while expressing confusion over the applicable law, the District Court provisionally accepted the board majority's plan for the 1975-1976 school year (Pet. App. 83a). The District Court recognized the very limited nature of the proposals, as well as the school board's failure to consider more promising alternative methods of accomplishing desegregation (Pet. App. 80a-81a). The board was directed to study the feasibility of adopting more signifi-

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explicit segregation policy of the Board . . ."; thereafter a new policy "effectively continued in practice the racial assignment of faculty through the 1970-71 school year" (Pet. App. 56a). With respect to school construction, the Court of Appeals noted "that in the period of greatest expansion of the Dayton school system, from the late 1940's to the mid-1960's, the great majority of new schools and additions were located by the Board in either virtually all black or all white areas" (Pet. App. 62a).

cant measures for the following school year (Pet. App. 81a).

The plaintiffs immediately appealed, moving for summary reversal and requesting specific remedial directives from the Court of Appeals; for after two years' experience with the Dayton Board's prior special programs and part-time desegregation, the systematic pattern of segregation had remained unchanged. The defendants did not cross-appeal.

In its opinion the Court of Appeals, to clear-up the District Court's confusion, first summarized the nature of the violation and the applicable law in this case:

> Segregative acts and practices were found to have occurred both before and after the decision of the Supreme Court in *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and to have continued down to the present time. These findings of fact as to segregative practices in Dayton are set forth in detail in our former opinion. . . . Sufficient to say that . . . [these] findings of fact . . . are supported by substantial evidence.[3] Although the phrase "de jure" does not appear in our former opinion, the meaning of that decision is that the Dayton school system has been and is guilty of de jure segregation

---

[3]The evidence of constitutional violation is more than substantial. For example, the evidence shows that just prior to *Brown* over half of the black students and all of the black teachers were isolated in four *all*-black schools as a direct result of the Board's intentionally segregative practices (Pet. App. 39a, 50a, 56a) and that, thereafter, staff continued to be assigned on a racial basis (Pet. App. 56a), new schools and additions opened almost always on a virtually uniracial basis (Pet. App. 62a), racially dual optional zones operated at one time or another to directly effect segregation at over 30 schools (e.g., Pet. App. 53a), and the Board deliberately chose in 1971 to perpetuate this pattern of segregation system-wide (Pet. App. 55a).

> practices. See *Keyes v. School District No. 1*, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).

(Pet. App. 89a-90a). The Court also reiterated that its previous remand therefore required formulation of a desegregation plan "consistent with the remedial guidelines" in *Swann* and *Keyes* (Pet. App. 90a).

The Court of Appeals then recognized the inadequate scope and very modest nature of the District Court's "remedy." After describing the plan (Pet. App. 91a-92a), the Court of Appeals said:

> This is essentially all the relief afforded by the District Court for the 1975-76 school year. . . . We believe, however, that more is required by the Constitution, by recent decisions of the Supreme Court . . ., and by the previous mandate of this Court. . . . [U]nder the plan approved by the District Court the basic pattern of one-race schools will continue largely unabated. The plan does not even purport to dismantle Dayton's one-race schools . . ., [and] the vast majority of one-race schools will remain identifiable as such.

(Pet. App. 92a-93a). However, in the Court of Appeals' view, insufficient time remained before the commencement of the 1975-76 school year for development and implementation of a comprehensive desegregation plan (Pet. App. 95a). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals neither affirmed nor reversed the order of the lower court, but merely remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings, with directions, *inter alia*, "that the District Court adopt a system-wide plan for the 1976-77 school year that will conform to the previous mandate of this court and to the decisions of the Supreme Court in *Keyes* and *Swann*" (Pet. App. 96a). The Court of Appeals directed that such a plan be

adopted by December 31, 1975, for implementation in September 1976.[4]

Defendant Dayton Board of Education now petitions for a writ of certiorari to review this judgment which merely remands the case for further proceedings, consistent with both the constitutional principles announced by this Court and with the law of the case as set forth in the Court of Appeals' prior opinion.

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED

1. This Court is properly chary about exercising its discretion to review interlocutory decisions of courts of appeals, particularly where the remand directs further, substantive proceedings in the trial court. *See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineermen v. Bangor and Aroostook R.R.*, 389 U.S. 327 (1967); *Hamilton Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers*, 240 U.S. 251, 257-258 (1916); and *American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville, T & K. R. Co.*, 148 U.S. 372, 384 (1893). And this case is particularly inappropriate for interlocutory review.

Both courts below held that the Dayton public schools are unlawfully segregated. Both courts recognized the

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[4]The Court of Appeals also directed that the plan previously approved by the District Court be modified prior to the 1975-76 school year with respect to the proposed reassignment of the all-black Miami Chapel Elementary students to other all-black schools, and with respect to as many of the other *de jure* segregated, one-race schools "as feasible" (Pet. App. 95a-96a). With the exception of the Miami Chapel situation, the District Court on remand ordered no modifications for the current school year. Plaintiffs filed further proceedings in the Court of Appeals to challenge the District Court's refusal to act. These further appellate proceedings, however, are not a part of Petitioners' present request for review by this Court.

need for development of steps toward desegregation in addition to the Petitioners' plan of voluntary and part-time "desegregation" for limited numbers of students. The District Court found that the Petitioner Dayton Board failed to consider "whether adjustments of existing school attendance zones would reduce concentrations of black and white attendance,"[5] "whether feasible pairing or clustering of schools could be accomplished," or whether other "numerous desegregation techniques . . . have been fully investigated" (Pet. App. 81a). Where the Petitioners have not cross-appealed from such a determination; where Petitioners apparently argue in this Court that such findings are critical (Pet. 14,17); and where the Court of Appeals has remanded for consideration of these very issues in light of its previous remand and this Court's controlling decisions in *Swann* and *Keyes*, there can be no warrant for review at this time.[6]

2. With respect to questions raised by the Petitioners concerning the nature of the constitutional violation and the scope of an adequate remedy, the Court of Appeals has adhered scrupulously to the decisions of this Court in *Swann, Keyes,* and *Milliken.* There is no conflict with the

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[5]We believe, however, that all parties concede that reliance solely on "walk-in" schools is insufficient.

[6] Perhaps the most significant modification of the District Court's order made by the Court of Appeals was to direct a specific deadline of December 31, 1975 for the District Court's consideration and adoption of a new desegregation plan for the 1976-77 school year. Since the Court of Appeals' directive is the least of the plaintiffs' entitlement, see *Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education,* 396 U.S. 19 (1969); *Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board,* 396 U.S. 226, 290 (1969), the Petitioner's purpose here might well be doubted. This Court ought not countenance any attempt to forestall timely compliance with the Court of Appeals' restrained directive by the pendency of this petition for writ of certiorari.

decisions of this Court, the Sixth Circuit, or any of the other Courts of Appeals. To the contrary, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is, manifestly, correct.[7] As in many other cases presented to this Court where school segregation was not originally mandated by explicit state law or local ordinance, *de jure* segregation has been found in the actual practices of school authorities, and system-wide desegregation has been directed. Such finding and direction here no more give rise to issues worthy of review than did the numerous petitions of other school boards involved in so-called "Northern" or non-statutory, but intra-district school segregation cases. *See, e.g., United States v. School District No. 151,* 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971); *Davis v. School District,* 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,

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[7]In an attempt to suggest some conflict or issue worthy of review, the Dayton Board points to the District Court's statement, on the first remand, that "at no time . . . did [the Dayton Board] maintain a dual system of education." See Pet. 2, 10, 15-16. The purported conflict and issue, however, relate to the District Court's confusion concerning the constitutional significance of "dual" or *"de jure."* The District Court apparently acted under the impression that these particular phrases are talismanic and apply only to explicit segregation policies mandated by state law or local ordinance. *See, e.g.,* Pet. App. 11a-12a. On the first appeal, the Court of Appeals attempted to edify the District Court (Pet. App. 39a-69a). On the second appeal, the Court of Appeals merely made more explicit to the District Court (and the Petitioners) what it had held on the first appeal: the unconstitutional segregation practiced by the Dayton Board constitutes *de jure* (or illegal) segregation and renders the system "dual" (or unconstitutionally segregated). See Statement, *supra* at 5-6 and Pet. App., e.g., 89a-90a. In so many words, the Court of Appeals stated that in so-called "Northern" school segregation litigation, substance not semantics must govern the constitutional inquiry—the very message which this Court has previously made clear in *Keyes.* That the Court of Appeals in this case thus properly performed its appellate function with respect to one of its district courts presents *no* conflict or issue worthy of review by this Court.

404 U.S. 913 (1971); *Kelly v. Guinn*, 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 919 (1973); *Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District*, 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920, 922 (1973); *Hart v. Community School Board*, 512 F.2d 37 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 943 (1974); *Oliver v. Michigan State Board of Education*, 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); *Morgan v. Kerrigan*, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); and *cf. Milliken v. Bradley*, 418 U.S. 717, 738 n. 18 (1974).

3. Given the nature of the violation and the remand here, there is no merit to the Petitioners' effort to establish a conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974. The Court of Appeals held: "We construe the 1974 Act, read as a whole, as not limiting either the nature or scope of the remedy for constitutional violations in the instant case" (Pet. App. 95a). That statement cannot contravene an enactment which provides that

> the provisions of this chapter are not intended to modify or diminish the authority of the courts of the United States to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

20 U.S.C. §1702(b). Cf. *Drummond v. Acree*, 409 U.S. 1228 (1972) (Powell, Circuit Justice).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied forthwith.

Respectfully submitted,

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